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ROAD MAP TO REVOLUTION? PATENT-BASED
OPEN SCIENCE
Lee Petherbridge, Ph.D.
The contemporary approach to innovation in the life sciences relies on a patentbased proprietary model. Limitations on patent rights and business concerns often
focus innovation to markets where the near-term monetary rewards are highest. This
is "efficient" under an austere understanding of the term, but the proprietary model can
be problematic from a practical perspective because it may not focus innovation to
certain deserving markets. This Article contends that the property rights conferred by
patent law may still serve as a positive base for innovation directed to underserved
markets. The comparatively strong rights conferred by patent law provide upstream
or pioneering innovators the power to establish some of the environmental conditions
in which subsequent innovation takes place. This includes a power to create an
environment of relatively open access to rights, which in appropriate cases may foster
efficiency gains, reduce innovation suppressive costs, and achieve production for
ultimate consumers at closer to marginal cost. In several parts, this paper discusses the
topography oflaw and innovation in the life sciences, the characteristics of innovation
in the life sciences that may support the use of patents to impose an "open science"
framework, a legal means of imposing such a framework using servitudes, and some
of the legal and economic implications of using patents in this manner. This Article
concludes that there are reasons why universities and research-oriented medical
schools should sometimes favor this approach and that limited testing should be
performed to determine the efficacy of the approach.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The difficult economic conditions of the l 970s 1 gave rise to important changes in
the innovation infrastructure of the life sciences. Where before patents were not sought
as a matter of course for inventions made in publicly funded university and medical

• Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The Author wishes to thank the
scholars and participants in the Closing in on Open Science Symposium at the University of Maine School
of Law, and the scholars and participants at The Evolution of the Open Source Model: To Life Saving
Drugs and Beyond symposium at Temple Law School, for their many helpful comments and suggestions.
Thanks to (in no particular order) Brietta Clark, Yann Joly, David Opderbeck, Kristen Osenga, Lorelei
Ritchie de Larena, Jason Rantanen, and R. Polk Wagner for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier
drafts, and/or discussing the ideas within this article during the course of its writing. It goes (nearly)
without saying that the fact that someone was kind enough to read and comment on a draft is not an
endorsement ofits contents-all mistakes are my own. I would also like to specifically thank Krystle V aziri
who provided excellent research assistance, and the editors of the Maine Law Review who labored to help
make this final product. Comments are appreciated: lee.petherbridge@lls.edu.
I. See, e.g., Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV.821,822 (2005)
( citing "economic recession, high unemployment, mass layoffs of scientists and engineers, and extreme
inflation").
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school laboratories, 2 the policy choices given effect in the Bayh-Dole Act 3 encouraged
the patenting of university inventions.4 The increase in university patenting, in tum,
altered the relationship between public science and private science. Where before the
inventions, e.g., the discovery and/or creation of new and useful knowledge,
information, and materials, of public science would, through publication, disclosure
at meetings, and other informal networks, eventually surface as public goods unfettered
with formal property rights, the policy choices given effect by the Bayh-Dole Act,
while perhaps encouraging earlier disclosure, also encouraged the consistent
attachment of formal property rights to the products of public science.
The consequence is that in the contemporary approach to innovation, formal
property rights, rather than being the feature which distinguishes public science from
private science, becomes a tool oftheir integration. Concepts of property, particularly
property as envisioned by the patent laws, now connect upstream public invention with
downstream innovation, e.g., research and development directed to the creation and
commercialization of products. Because of the cumulative nature ofinnovation in the
life sciences, now more than ever, universities and firms are supposed to take into
account property rights when they make decisions on what experiments to perform and
how to spend precious research and development dollars.
The goal of the policy of encouraging universities to patent their diverse range of
inventive output is to encourage innovation. By mechanisms now familiar to even
first-year law students, the legal rights conveyed in a patent, particularly the right to
exclude, allow rights holders to appropriate some of the benefits of innovative work.
The ability to appropriate benefits serves as an ex ante incentive to take on economic
risk-the risk involved with the uncertainty-laden task of attempting to create new and
useful products and processes.
While this approach logically encourages investment in innovation, it has the
drawback of concentrating capital for innovation directed to either the highest benefit
expected innovations, or at a minimum, innovations where the benefits can be
predicted to be greater than the cost of innovation. In particular, innovation may be
directed away from: (I) diseases that are perceived as having low commercial value
because they either affect large numbers of the economically disenfranchised 5 or

2. See, e.g., Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry: Drug
Development Under Today's New Institutional Arrangements Could Tum Out to Be Faster and Better, but
Not Cheaper, 23 HEALTHAFFAIRSI 0, 13-14 (2004) (describing an "essentially binary" industry structure).
3. Universities and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § b(a) 94 Stat. 3018
(1980) [hereinafter Bayh-Dole Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of35 U.S.C.).
4. The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act is "to promote the utilization ofinventions arising from federally
supported research or development." 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
5. By some estimates, "[d]eveloping countries account for four-fifths of the world's population, but
less than ten percent of the global pharmaceutical market." Ellen F. M. Hoen, The Responsibility of
Research Universities to Promote Access to Essential Medicines, 3 YALEJ. OFHEALTHPOL'y, L & ETHICS,
293,295 (2003). See Stephen M. Maurer, et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source
an Answer, PLOS 1(3): e56 (2004) (discussing neglected diseases such as leishmania, sleeping sickness,
chagas, and malaria); Patrice Troullier & Piero Olliaro, Drug Development Output from 1975 to 1996:
What Proportion for Tropical Diseases, 3(2) INT'LJ. OFINFECTIOUSDISEASES61 ( 1998-99) (reporting that
only about one-percent of chemical entities commercialized were directed to these and other important
tropical diseases including filariasis, helminthic infections, trypanosymiasis, leishmaniasis, malaria, and
shistosomiasis; also reporting that only a fraction of those drugs were other than incidental discoveries).

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 341 2007

342

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:2

because they affect small numbers ofindividuals 6 (almost) regardless of their economic
status; or (2) projects involving highly complex scientific research of the sort that
requires such a large number of participants that it may not be efficiently performed
by a single lab, 7 or even by a single commercial entity.

More primary information revealing the broad impact of these diseases can be found at the World Health
Organization website. One example includes
Lymphatic Filariasis, known as Elephantiasis, [which] puts at risk more than a billion
people .... Over 120 million have already been affected by it, [and] over 40 million of
them are seriously incapacitated and disfigured by the disease. One-third of the people

infected,vith the disease live in L,din,one thirdare in ~~T.ca[,]and most of the remainder
are in South Asia, the Pacific[,] and the Americas ...
Lymphatic filiariasis causes a heavy social burden because it is "primarily a disease of the poor ... [and]
... has steadily increased because of the expansion of slum areas and poverty, especially in Africa and the
Indian sub-continent. As many filariasis patients are physically incapacitated, it is also a disease that
TION,FACTSHEETNO.
prevents patients from having a normal working life." WORLDHEALTH0RGANIZA
(2000), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/fact-sheets/fs I 02/en/.
FILARIASIS
I 02: LYMPHATIC
Another example is "[m]alaria[, which] is an infection caused by a parasite and carried from person
to person by mosquitoes. It is preventable and curable but kills more than one million people-most of
them young children living in Africa-each year." World Health Organization, Global Malaria Programme,
http://malaria.who.int/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
Annual economic growth in countries with high malaria transmission has historically been
lower than in countries without malaria. Economists believe that malaria is responsible for
a 'growth penalty' ofup to 1.3% per year in some African countries. When compounded
over the years, this penalty leads to substantial differences in GDP between countries with
and without malaria and severely restrains the economic growth of the entire region.
Roll Back Malaria, http://www.rbm.who.int/cmc_upload/O/OOO /015/363/RBM!nfosheet_lO.htm (last
visited Jan. 22, 2007).
Regarding Dengue Fever: "Some 2500 million people--two fifths of the world's population-are now
at risk from dengue. WHO currently estimates there may be 50 million cases of dengue infection worldwide
every year." There are over five hundred thousand hospitalizations each year and up to a 20 percent
TIONFACTSHEETNO.
mortality rate when an infection is not property treated. WORLDHEALTH0RGANIZA
117: DENGUE AND DENGUE HAEMORRHAGICFEVER (2002), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
factsheets/fs 117/en/.
It is worth noting that while the fatalities associated with these and other neglected diseases are
clearly significant, the social impact of these diseases goes well beyond causing deaths. Those who do not
die may be chronically affected. Thus, in many of these cases it may be myopic to think of innovation
directed to these diseases as having low commercial value. It is perhaps another imperfection of a propertybased system that it is structurally unable to appropriate the social benefits lost to these diseases.
6. The list of these diseases would be, perhaps, impossibly long. A few examples of diseases with low
commercial value include Epidermolytic Hyperkeratosis, which is characterized by blistering and scaling
of the skin that looks similar in appearance to corrugated cardboard and is caused by mutations in
epidermal keratins. See J.A. Rothnagel et al., Mutations in the Rod Domains of Keratins 1 and JO in
Epidermolytic Hyperkeratosis, 257 SCIENCE1128, 1128 (1992). Epidermolysis Bullosa Simplex causes
a severe form of blistering due to basal keratinocyte cytolysis in about I in every 50,000 people. See Pierre
A. Coulombe et al., Point Mutations in Human Keratin 14 Genes of Epidermolysis Bullosa Simplex
Patients: Genetic and Functional Analyses, 66 CELL 1301, 1301 (1991). Another example is Rett
syndrome, which
is a genetic disorder that strikes roughly one in I 0,000 girls just as they are beginning to
walk and talk. After developing normally for about a year, girls with the syndrome regress,
losing any words they've learned as well as the ability to make purposeful movements. They
end up with severe mental and physical disabilities and require full-time care.
See Greg Miller, Getting a Read on Rett Syndrome, 314 SCIENCE1536, 1536 (2006).
7. See, e.g., R. Taussig et al., Overview of the Alliance for Cell Signaling, 420 NATURE703, 703
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In several parts, this Article explains that the prudent use of a patent-based open
science approach may provide an appropriate complement to current paradigms of
innovation in the life sciences. Part II begins by setting forth a topography of
innovation in the life sciences. As is nearly universally acknowledged, that topography
reveals universities and medical schools performing broad-based scientific research
funded in significant part by public monies. This section also notes how the outputs
of this "public" science, often too undeveloped for broad commercial application,
frequently serve as substrates, or inputs, for subsequent "private" scientific research
performed by for-profit firms. This leveraging of public science in service ofnational
economic policy is, Part II explains, imposed in part through propertization of the
outputs of public science. As this part of the Article further explains, propertization
is importantly imposed through the patent laws, creating a rights environment with
several significant features and implications. One implication is the necessary
production of what this Article terms "innovation suppressive costs," which can affect
the path and progress of innovation. Thus, Part II sketches a picture of an innovation
framework that is both sequential and cumulative in quality, one involving different
actors with different motivations, but who share a nexus in property rights. A
framework in which downstream "private" science actors depend on the information,
materials, and rights created by upstream "public" science actors.
Part III acknowledges the perceived significance of property rights to innovation,
and from that perspective observes that efforts to develop innovation frameworks that
may better serve certain markets should be complementary to patent-based approaches.
From this view, it is suggested that the focus should be on refining the deployment of
property rights to encourage innovation ends rather than attenuating or disrupting what
is widely accepted to be a general usefulness of property rights in promoting
investment in, and the production of, innovation. In seeking a framework for
refinement, this part focuses on mechanisms that might reduce innovation suppressive
costs and, additionally, provide positive efficiency gains by encouraging the
participation of peer innovators. This part discusses features of innovation in the life
sciences that suggest that an open science approach ( one crafted to provide relatively
liberal access to rights) may sometimes be not only appropriate, but also desirable. It
finds helpful analogies by comparing innovation in the life sciences to aspects of the
open source software framework and recent works generalizing principles important
for peer production. This part concludes that some life science research and
development is amenable to an open science approach.
The theoretical and factual points developed in Parts II and III are brought
together and applied in Part IV in search ofa legal means of imposing a patent-based
open science framework. After considering other possible approaches to directing
innovation to underserved markets, this part proposes the use of a servitude on a
patent. As discussed, this approach can fit comfortably within the current proprietary
framework, can be deployed in forms that do not pose the threat of serious harm to the

(2002) [hereinafter Alliance for Cell Signaling] (describing a project to comprehensively examine cell
signaling pathways); Arti K. Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Mode/for Biomedicine, in
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTYRIGHTSIN FRONTIERINDUSTRIES131-58 (Robert W. Hahn ed., AEI Brookings
Press 2005) (analyzing the approach taken by Alliance for Cell Signaling).
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ubiquitous rights-based innovative framework, and is especially useful when a potential
commercial product is perceived to be far off or of uncertain commercial value. Thus,
this part sets forth and discusses a framework for the measured application of patent
servitudes in life sciences research.
Part V offers some concluding remarks and points to a number of reasons why it
may sometimes be in the best interest of universities and research-oriented medical
schools to use the approach described in Part IV. It also proposes that the approach
be tested experimentally, so information can be gathered on potential drawbacks, the
interest in working subject matter with the "open" restriction, and metrics that may
reveal the practical desirability vel non of the approach. Data should be collected and
reported upon periodically.
II. A TOPOGRAPHY OF INNOVATION AND LAW IN THE LIFE SCIENCES

A. The Industrial Infrastructure: Integrating Public and Private Science
For most of the twentieth century innovation in the life sciences has been
dominated by the firms of the pharmaceutical industry. Until the lastthirty years or so,
a typical firm was both large and fully integrated in terms of its capacity to process
innovation from drug discovery, to clinical trials, to regulatory approval for marketing,
to manufacturing and quality control. 8 These firms relied heavily on patents and other
forms ofintellectual property to appropriate returns from innovation (i.e., downstream
research and development). 9
During the same period, publicly funded science performed in laboratories at
universities and medical schools was rarely patented. 10 Instead the new and useful
knowledge, information, and materials created by public science made its way into the
public domain as it gradually surfaced at study sections, at scientific conferences, in
publications, or through a variety of informal networks of scientific communication.
Thus, pharmaceutical firms typically accessed publicly funded upstream inventions at
low cost. Moreover, upon being sufficiently distributed the inventions generated by
public science generally took on the trappings of public goods, serving as tools and
resources to scientists in both private and public science in a nonrivalrous manner.
In the 1970s, economic conditions caused the United States to take stock of its
economic strengths and weaknesses. 11 According to Circuit Judge Pauline Newman
it was "recognized then . . . that our economic strength as a nation depends on
technological leadership, the balance of trade, and a culture that favors creativity,
entrepreneurship, and industrial activity. " 12 This period ofintrospection also produced
the understanding that some of the identified aspects of national economic strength

8. See Cockburn, supra note 2, at 13.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 14; see also Association of University Technology Managers, AUTM U.S. Licensing
Survey: FY 2004 available at http://www.autm.net/events/File/04AUTMSurveySum-USpublic.pdf (last
visited Jan. 22, 2007) [hereinafter AUTM Survey] (reporting that universities were issued fewer than 250
patents in 1980).
11. Newman, supra note I, at 822 (citing "economic recession, high unemployment, mass layoffs of
scientists and engineers, and extreme inflation").
12. Id. at 821.
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could be encouraged or discouraged by governmental policy. 13 One aspect of
government policy implicated by the studies and testimony of the time was the law and
policy of patents. What was concluded was that the patent system had become so
weakened over the preceding years that it had lost its ability to support investment in
the creation and commercialization of new and improved products. 14
What followed in the 1980s was a wave oflegislative action intended to encourage
innovation and rescue the country from recession. Perhaps the most notable pieces of
legislation were targeted to the patent system: the Bayh-Dole Act 15 and the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 16 which created the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act is "to promote the
utilization of the inventions arising from federally supported research or
development." 17 Its policy goal is largely achieved by clarifying the rules concerning
the ownership of patents on inventions created using federally funded research. The
purposes of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 are several, but one
important purpose is to unify appellate jurisdiction to promote clarity, predictability,
and certainty in the patent law. 18
These policy choices took place in a background environment of very broadly
written patent statutes 19 and case law that already permitted making property of a wide
range oflife science outputs. 20 Adding to the mix was the advent in (mostly) university
laboratories of immunological, cellular, and molecular technologies, which made
useable a new array of materials and methods important in the prosecution of
innovation in the life sciences. The market consequences of this combination of
political, legal, and technological change were that university patenting behavior
increased by a fold. In 1980, the year the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, universities were
issued fewer than 250 patents. In 2004, they received 3,680 patents and filed over
10,500 patent applications. 21
The consequence to public science of these technological and legal changes has
been substantial. Encouraging universities to engage in the formal propertization of
publicly funded discovery, invention, and in some cases, innovation has significantly
increased the influence of public science on private science as well as the reverse.
Universities are now active participants in the patent system. 22 Although they are less

13. Id. at 822.
14. Id.
15. Bayh-Dole Act, supra note 3.
16. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of28 U.S.C.).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
18. The Federal Circuit was created for a number of other reasons, as its broad subject matter
jurisdiction attests. See, e.g., Newman, supra note I, at 823-24 (describing the various jurisdictions).
However, one important reason for the creation of the Federal Circuit was to unify patent jurisprudence and
bring clarity and certainty to the law. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. I, 2 (I 989).
19. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (describing the broad intent of
Congress in enacting 35 U.S.C. § IOI).
20. See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 102-14 (S.D.N.Y. 191 !), a.ff din
part, I 96 F. 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1912) (finding patentable a natural biochemical substance purified away
from its natural environs).
21. AUTM Survey, supra note I 0.
22. Id.
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likely than commercial entities to patent therapeutic end products, universities often
obtain patent rights to "upstream" inventions that in terms of innovation serve
primarily as substrates for future research and development. Upstream inventions may
include tools and reagents necessary for future research 23 such as nucleic acid
sequences 24 and proteomic targets, 25 which may serve as potential targets for chemical
or small-molecule therapeutics. Other upstream inventions patented by universities
may include new techniques 26 and important materials derived from the application of
new techniques, 27 both of which may serve as important platforms for subsequent
advances across a large number oflife science disciplines. 28
In many cases involving patents directed to "upstream" inventions, universities
license the patents to smaller biotechnology firms or startups. Relying on the licensed
patents, these smaller firms seek to attract funding sufficient to perform additional
research and development. The goals of smaller firms can be varied, but common
goals include advancing the state of development by, e.g., perfecting a technique,
applying a technique to acquire a new or important substrate or target, or manipulating
and testing genomic or proteomic inventions in animal models to establish a key
understanding or proof of principle. These incremental advances can then be used to
garner more financial support or can be sold or licensed to larger biotechnology or
pharmaceutical firms.
Broadly speaking, it is larger biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms that perform
the tasks associated with later-stage innovation in the life sciences. This generally
includes advancing promising technologies to the point where products can be
profitably produced and marketed to consumers. Because these larger firms often sell
the commercial embodiments of research outputs to consumers, they typically have
positive revenue streams and have proven consistently capable of concentrating capital
through both revenues and access to financial markets. As licensing partners of
universities or smaller firms, or both, these larger firms have the expertise to identify

23. See, e.g., Method for the Detection of NF-kappa B Regulatory Factors, U.S. Patent No. 6,232,081
(filed Oct. 15, I 998).
24. See, e.g., Keratin Kl Expression Vectors and Methods of Use, U.S. Patent No. 5,914,265 (filed
Nov. I, 1993); Human C/EBP Gene and Vectors for its Expression, U.S. Patent No. 5,545,563 (filed Mar.
4, 1994).
25. See, e.g., Nucleic Acid and Amino Acid Sequences for Mammalian Sulfonylurea Receptor, U.S.
Patent No. 6,054,313 (filed June 7, 1995).
26. See, e.g., Stanley Fields & Ok-kyn Song, A Novel Genetic System to Detect Protein-Protein
Interactions, 340 NATURE245, 245-46 (1989) (reporting the yeast two hybrid system); System to Detect
Protein-Protein Interactions, U.S. Patent No. 5,283,173 (filed Jan. 24, 1990); see also Mutated Steroid
Hormone Receptors, Methods for Their Use and Molecular Switch for Gene Therapy, U.S. Patent No.
5,935,934 (filed May 30, 1995); Methods for the Genetic Modification of Endogenous Genes in Animal
Cells by Homologous Recombination, U.S. Patent No. 5,614,396 (filed Feb. 22, 1994); Transgenic Mice
Containing a Disrupted p53 Gene, U.S. Patent No. 5,569,824 (filed July 21, 1994); Transgenic Non-Human
Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984).
27. See, e.g., Sulfonylurea ReceptorTrangenic Rodents, U.S. Patent No. 6,03 I, I 50 (filed June 7, 1995);
Non-Human Animal Having Predefined Allele ofa Cellular Adhesion Gene, U.S. Patent No. 5,602,307
(filed Sept. 20, 1994); see also, e.g., '313 Patent (Claims 5, 8, & 9 pertaining to cell lines); Permanent
Human Hepatocyte Cell Line and its Use in a Liver Assist Device (LAD), U.S. Patent No. 5,290,684 (filed
Oct. 23, 1992) (also pertaining to cell lines).
28. See '173 Patent; '934 Patent; '396 Patent.
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and select upstream work that seems most promising from both a technical and
profitability standpoint. With some of the risk concentrated on universities and smaller
firms, these larger firms can focus on other cost-intensive aspects of innovation in the
life sciences such as later-stage drug development with its attendant animal and clinical
trials, registration and marketing approvals, manufacture, quality control, and
marketing and sales.
As described in more detail below, principles of property, and particularly of
patent rights, play a central role in the relationship between these market actors and
therefore in the path and progress of innovation in the life sciences. Universities and
research-oriented medical schools create and collect important property rights but are
generally not structured to engage in later-stage innovation. Subsequent innovation
performed by start-ups and smaller biotechnology companies often rely on property
rights established first by universities and research-oriented medical schools. Further
innovation creates additional property rights, which, like other upstream rights, must
be identified and bundled for use by later innovators or by firms that market products
to consumers. Thus, the path and progress of innovation in the life sciences is closely
tied to the existence of property rights, the number and variety of those rights, and the
relationships and business acumen of rights holders.

B. The Legal Infrastructure: A Proprietary Approach
29
While traditional notions of property rights as applied to chattels apply to goods
and services produced by the life sciences industry, the intangible quality ofintellectual
goods combined with a low cost of imitation may seriously degrade or even largely
destroy the ability of innovators to appropriate benefits from very cost-heavy
innovations. This innovation suppressive effect is compensated for by complementing
basic common law property principles with statutory patent law. 30 This creates

29. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).
30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000). The copyright laws, codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-1,332 (2000), are
another example ofa statutory complement to common law property principles in pursuit of the production
of intangible goods. One thing that separates the rights conferred by the patent laws from the rights
conferred by the copyright laws is the breadth and depth of protection. Copyright law protects original
works ofauthorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § I 02 (2000); see Feist Publ'ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,345 (1991). But while copyright law creates a lengthy term and
imposes liability for derivative works, copyright law affords a scope of propertization that is thin in
comparison to patent law. Copyright protection does not extend to facts, see Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, nor
to "any idea," see Baker v. Selden, IOI U.S. 99, 102 (1879), "procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery," 17 U.S.C. § I 02(b) (2000). Patent law stands in sharp relief
because it allows for the protection of the innovation of nearly all of these things to some extent depending
on the degree to which an applicant can capture them by strategic claiming. 35 U.S.C. § IOI (2000)
("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title."). The exceptions in the patent laws are reflected in the general
unpatentability of laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. See, e.g., Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 44 7 U.S. 303, 309- 10 ( I 980) (collecting cases prohibiting such patents but finding patentable
claims to genetically modified living organisms); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981)
(finding patentable subject matter involving an algorithm); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189
F. 95, 102-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part, 196 F. 496,498 (2d Cir. 1912)(finding patentable a natural
biochemical substance purified from its natural environs).
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property rights in intangible goods,3 1 thereby enhancing the ability of the owner to
appropriate the benefits of innovative work. 32 Consequently, the formal proprietary
tool most often used in connection with life sciences research is patent law.33
The putative benefit of this legal infrastructure is the well-worn concept of the
patent bargain. Its deep normative basis is evident in the U.S. Constitution, which
authorizes Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . .
Discoveries." 34 In the bargain, the public grants property rights and accepts the
potential of supramarginal cost pricing in exchange for the disclosure of new and
useful information and an increase in quality of life derived from innovation-the
development and production of new or improved processes, machines, manufactures,
and compositions of matter.
In the United States, patents are generally available for "anything under the sun
that is made by man" 35 and that is new, 36 useful, 37 and nonobvious. 38 Indeed, most of
the industrialized and developing world has either implemented or agreed to implement
standards that are roughly the same. 39 Patents are available on a wide range of life
science inputs and outputs. A limited list might include patents directed to nucleic acid
sequences that comprise genes, 40 complementary DNA,4 1 and/or polypeptides. 42

31. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (stating that "patents shall have the attributes of personal property").
32. Id. at§ 271 (2000) (defining an infringer as someone who "without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any
patented invention").
33. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT.SCI. 173, 175
( 1986) (reporting that patents are very important in the development of pharmaceuticals).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
35. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
36. 35 u.s.c.§ 102 (2000).
37. Id. at§ 101.
38. Id. at§ 103(a), (b)(l).
39. The Agreement requiring harmonization referred to here is the "TRIPS Agreement." Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement). The express standards contained in the TRIPS Agreement are "new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application." Id. at Art. 27, para. 1. The TRIPS Agreement
further explains that "[f]or the purposes of this Article, the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable ofindustrial
application' may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful'
respectively." Id. at n.5.
40. See, e.g., Clontech Labs, Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing a
claim ofU.S. Patent No. 5,405,776 directed to a polynucleotide); Cyclin E Genes and Proteins, U.S. Patent
No. 5,973,119 (filed June 5, 1998); see also, supra note 24 (U.S. Patents Nos. 5,914,265 and 5,545,563).
41. See, e.g., CDNA Collections Encoding Proteins Regulated During Programmed Cell Death, and
Method ofUse Thereof, U.S. Patent No. 5,928,871 (filed Sept. 8, 1997).
42. See, e.g., Clontech Labs, Inc., 406 F.3d at 1350 (citing a claim of U.S. Patent No. 5,244,797
directed to a polypeptide).
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Patents are also available for cell lines, 43 screening methods, 44 expression systems, 45
transgenic animals, 46 and a host of other research outputs, tools, and methods.
In law, patent rights are protected by the right to exclude, 47 a property rule. 48
Theoretically, any stranger to the right who desires to make, use, or sell embodiments
of patented subject matter must negotiate permission from the right holder. 49 This
principle gives rise to two features of the patent law important when considering
sequential or other cumulative innovation. First, an infringer of patent rights (e.g.,
someone who without authority uses the claimed subject matter) who knows nothing
of a patent will still be found to infringe that patent and under general principles of
equity subject to an injunction. 50 Second, the principle extends to situations where a
patentee seeks to practice an invention claimed in the patentee's own patent(s). The
consequence is that the owner of a patent and its attendant rights does not possess the
affirmative legal right to practice the subject matter claimed in a patent. Thus, a patent

43. See, e.g., supra note 27.
44. See, e.g., supra note 26.
45. See, e.g., Expression Vector Systems and Method of Use, U.S. Patent No. 5,925,564 (filed June
7, 1995); Growth Hormone Releasing Hormone Expression System and Methods of Use, Including Use in
Animals, U.S. Patent No. 6,423,693 (filed July 24, 1998).
46. See, e.g., supra note 26.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(l) (2000) (stating that a patent shall contain a grant of"the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling ... or importing .... "). See also id. at§§ 271,283
(establishing infringement and authorizing injunctions for "violation of any right secured by patent");
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, at Art. 28 (a patent "confer[s] on its owner ... exclusive rights").
48. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.L. REV. 1089 (1972) (describing property rules and liability rules).
The normal remedy for patent infringement includes the equitable remedy of injunction to prevent the
continued violation of rights secured by a patent. Compare Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F .2d
1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting the general rule that a permanent injunction will issue once
infringement and validity have been determined)with eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837
(2006) (suggesting the differing views of the Justices as to the validity of the use ofa property rule in most
patent cases) and Richard A. Epstein et al., Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent, eBay, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 183 7 (2006) (arguing for maintaining a property
rule). Despite a strong preference for a property rule in the case of patents, equity has always recognized
limitations. Thus, a court may decline to enter an injunction after determining infringement and validity
when the patentee's failure to practice an invention frustrates an important public need. See Rite-Hite Corp.
v. Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. I 995). That is not to say that there are not jurisdictions where
patents are occasionally treated as though they were protected by a liability rule. For instance, the TRIPS
Agreement permits compulsory licensing under certain circumstances. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note
39, at Art. 27 para. 3. Even in the United States, a compulsory license is possible. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498
(2000). However, such a license seems rarely to have been taken.
49. Because notice problems and strategic behavior make for an imperfect reality, patent rights are
additionally protected by a liability rule. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (authorizing damages "adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty" for periods where an
infringer is without knowledge of the patentee's rights). Liability is also the remedy where an infringer
knowingly disregards a patentee's rights. In such situations, however, liability is enhanced. See generally
id. at§ 284 (stating that "the court may increase the damages up to three times").
50. Id. at§ 283; see, e.g., eBay, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841 ("injunctive reliefrests within the equitable
discretion of the ... court, and ... such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles
of equity .... ").
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owner using the subject matter claimed in her own patent can still be adjudged an
infringer,5 1 subject to damages and equitable relief, where the practice of her own
patent infringes overlapping rights granted to a competitor by a different patent.
The first feature follows from a straightforward application of the right to exclude.
While the first is not generally known by a special title, the application of the property
rule acts to "block" the use of claimed subject matter without permission. This allows
the patentee to "holdout." As a general matter, this is the contemplated mechanism of
the patent system. 52 In the context of sequential innovation the block may be of special
impact where by its nature sequential innovation presents one or very few paths
forward.
In the parlance of the patent law, the second feature refers to the patent Jaw
phenomenon of "blocking patents." 53 The earlier patentee may be "blocked" from
practicing his invention by another patent directed to an improvement unless
permission can be obtained from the downstream innovator. Naturally, the law of
property and contracts make such permissions possible. However, as later discussed, 54
as more rights need to be collected, the more likely it becomes that inefficient friction
may develop in the transfer of rights.
It is not too facile to suspect that the blocking nature of the rights conferred by
patent laws has an impact on the path and progress of sequential or cumulative
innovation. On the one hand, it is the blocking feature of the patent laws that is
thought to encourage the production of intangible property. On the other hand, the
blocking feature of the patent Jaws may allow a patentee to establish a monopoly and
may increase the costs of transaction where numerous rights must be bundled to
practice an invention or engage in subsequent innovation. These latter two situations
give rise to two types of what shall be referred to as "innovation suppressive costs." 55

51. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (citing Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) ("[T]here
is no practicing the prior art defense to literal infringement.").
52. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persis/ant Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727 (2000).
53. This effect is caused by the nuances of patent law that permit new patents to fall within the scope
of old patents and old patents to fall within the scope of new patents. A stereotypical example includes the
situation where an inventor discovers a new use for known (or no longer patentable) materials. See Rohm
& Haas Inc., v. Roberts Chem. Co., 245 F.2d 693, 699 (4th Cir. 1957) (describing the statutory change
creating patentability in this circumstance); 35 U.S.C. § I 00(b) (2000) (the term "process" includes "a new
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material"). Another related
example is where one inventor obtains a patent directed to a category, or genus, of substances and a later
inventor patents the discovery that certain members of the category, or species, are especially useful for the
same purposes as the general category of substances, or for different purposes altogether. See Coming
Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec., 868 F.2d 1251, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 1989). There are policy justifications for
granting later patents in these types of circumstances. For additional discussion of blocking patents and
their impact on innovation, see MarkA. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) and Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN.L. REV. 75 (1994).
54. See discussion infra Part 11.B.2.
55. The term "innovation suppressive costs" is meant to describe the independent effect of the costs.
It is not used to claim that a particular innovation has been thwarted either because of monopoly or because
of high transaction costs. All the term acknowledges is that when one elects a property-based approach,
one gets the good with the less good. What ultimately matters is the utility of the approach. As long as on
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1. The Innovation Suppressive Cost of Monopoly
The consequences of a monopoly in innovation generally are much debated. 56
Under one view, largely attributed to Joseph A. Schumpeter, 57 larger firms are
expected to be more innovative than smaller firms. The nature of capitalism,
characterized by its inherent feature of "Creative Destruction," 58 drives a form of
competition directed not to incremental increases in marginal profits, but directed
instead to changes that provide more radical selective advantage. 59 The threat of
selective disadvantage (i.e., being left behind) is "ever-present" 60 and because of the
catastrophic consequences that follow from a failure to evolve, a monopolist can never
sit on his hands; he must run, i.e., innovate, as fast as he can to stay just where he is.
According to this view, an environment that includes monopolies or oligopolies
may not only foster innovation, but may be particularly important to achieving
innovation. 61 Because of supramarginal cost profits, it is these entities that have the
ability to hedge the risks associated with innovation. 62 Moreover, the profits and
market position enjoyed by the monopolist or oligopolist make it likely that such firms
will be able to more fully appropriate the benefits of their innovations, which in tum
supports subsequent innovation. 63 Firms unable to maintain supramarginal cost pricing
can be expected to have a more difficult time concentrating the capital necessary for
innovation and have a greater likelihood of expiring when costly innovation does not
produce profitable products.

balance a property-based approach results in greater social value than another approach, e.g., a commonsbased approach, then it is superior (as long as utility remains the measure, that is). The innovation
suppressive effects of the use of property rights are internal to the calculation of the overall value of a
property-based approach. By this definition, there are other innovation suppressive effects of the patent
laws, e.g., the fact that patent laws make patented innovations developed earlier in time constantly
vulnerable to appropriation by later comers who develop new and useful improvements. Acknowledging
the existence ofinnovation suppressive costs is useful, particularly where the costs can be segregated in vivo
from the benefits to innovation conferred by property rights. If innovation suppressive costs can be limited
in a particular situation without interfering too much with the incentives to innovate, a net social benefit
may be achieved.
56. See, Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role
TECH.L.J. 813, 823-44 (2001) [hereinafter Fostering Cumulative
of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY
Innovation] (discussing the merits of concentration and competition).
57. JOSEPHA. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM
ANDDEMOCRACY
81-106 {1942).
58. Id. at 83.
59. Id. at 84-85 (stating, inter a/ia, that the competition that counts is that directed to "the new
commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization").
60. Id. at 85.
61. Id. at 87-106.
62. Some additional risk-reducing strategies available to large dominant firms are summarized at:
To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent
FEDERALTRADECOMMISSION,
Law Policy ch. 2, p. 12-13 (2003) [hereinafter To Promote Innovation], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l 0/innovationrpt.pdf, including spreading the cost ofR&D across a wide range
of output, maintaining multiple research and development projects, accessing financial markets, and more
efficient internalization of the benefits of innovation.
63. Id. at ch. 2, p. 13.
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The legal rights attending a patent can sometimes confer a monopoly on the
holder, 64 and may thus provide the patent owner market power useful to hedge the risks
associated with innovation. But even where the property rights conferred by a patent
do not create a monopoly, they may be capable of serving a similar centralizing
purpose. 65 Under this view, patents directed to substrates for future research and
development serve as "prospects." 66 Broader rights, the thinking goes, increase the
efficiency with which investment in innovation can be managed. As long as
information about patent rights is both available and reasonably clear, 67 it is unlikely
that a competitor will make a significant investment in commercializing a patent owned
by another unless an agreement on appropriation can be reached. Structurally, this
permits the property rights holder to coordinate innovation concerning the property.
Having more concentrated the costs and benefits ofinnovation on the rights holder, he
or she should be highly motivated to organize subsequent innovation in order to avoid
wasting resources. 68 Moreover, because broader rights can be expected to increase
appropriability, a patent owner has the possibility of greater return, which justifies
greater investment in the commercialization of the patented subject matter. 69
Thus, from at least a theoretical perspective, granting broad upstream patent rights
may be an efficient approach to innovation because centralization may have a costreducing effect. This allows for at least some innovation that might not happen in a
higher cost environment. In addition, cost-reducing centralization may increase the
rate of innovation. Lower cost advances consume fewer resources and capital
available for innovation, permitting their redeployment to other projects capable of
generating new innovation. Alternatively, an increase in the rate of innovation could
occur because the upstream rights holder focuses subsequent innovative work on, and
applies the resources and capital saved by centralization to, the subject matter most
critical to achieving a subsequent innovation. Put most plainly, prospect theory holds
that as compared to a decentralized system that allows for a more free competition in
the use of closely related rights-and thus, perhaps a greater likelihood of duplicative
work---centralization should result in more innovation per innovation dollar expended.
Such a laudatory view of the merits of either monopoly, oligopoly, or other form
of centralization is not universal. Notwithstanding the possible waste associated with

64. It is not necessary that a patent confer a monopoly, and the majority of patents are unlikely to do
so. See Kitch, supra note 52, at 1729-34 (explaining that a general conflation of intellectual property rights
with the concept of monopoly is improper because it erroneously divorces the economic significance of
property rights from an analysis of whether property rights confer a monopoly). However, as later
discussed, due to the nature of innovation in the life sciences, patent rights may permit the rights holder to
be the sole seller of a particular kind or class of product or service. For these goods, effective noninfringing substitutes may be rare. Thus, monopoly or near-monopoly conditions may sometimes exist.
65. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.265, 27580 (1977).
66. Id.
67. This proposition provides a contrast to trade secrecy. Id. at 275, 277-78. Although few would
argue with this contention, removed from comparison to trade secrecy, however, the notion that patent
rights are well noticed may be optimistic. See Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 191212 (2006) (arguing that meaningful patent system reform should focus heavily on improving the notice
function of patents).
68. Kitch, supra note 65, at 276.
69. Id. at 277-78.
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duplicating work, scholars Robert Merges and Richard Nelson contend that
competition may be a more efficient way to get improvement. 7° First, and perhaps
foremost according to this view, the monopolist is encouraged only by the "carrot." 71
Rivalrous competition adds the "stick" to the formula; a penalty for inaction. 72 In
addition, there is reason to question the attraction of the carrot. In situations where the
products of innovation would cannibalize a monopolist's existing sales and where
those sales would be unaffected in the absence of the monopolist's innovations, the
monopolist may not be well-motivated to take on the expenditures ofinnovation. 73
In addition, the benefits of centralization flow in significant degree from the fact
that broad upstream rights holders have some reliable conception of which subsequent
innovations are valuable, and perhaps even a conception of the embodiments of the
subsequent innovations. Endowing rights holders with the omniscience to know both
which improvements are valuable and how to most efficiently organize research and
development to achieve such improvements may be overly optimistic. 74 If the
upstream rights holder erroneously organizes around an approach that cannot work or
is otherwise intractable because, e.g., it relies on erroneous information or a limited
complementary technology, innovation can be delayed or halted.
In such
circumstances, innovation could become very expensive.
The duplicative work associated with races to innovate may not be as wasteful as
it at first might appear. Competition generates better consumer products at lower
prices. 75 Moreover, competitors with diverse goals and purposes may be important for
making valuable improvements to a broad upstream innovation. Because competitors
will often, if not invariably, take different approaches, apply different tools, and make
different logical connections in view of the resources (e.g., money, tools, and
information) they possess, different approaches may prove to have independent social
value. 76
Regardless of whether a centralized or diverse approach to innovation is best
suited to provide efficient innovation, the use of exclusive property rights raises the
specter of monopoly. Where a patent does confer a monopoly or near monopoly on
its holder, it has the potential to add costs to a system of sequential or cumulative
innovation. 77 The lower output, higher demand, and higher price realized in a

70. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 839-40 (1990).
71. Id. at 872.
72. But see SCHUMPETER,
supra note 57, at 87-106 (arguing, in effect, that the stick is "ever-present").
73. See KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in
THE RATEANDDIRECTIONOF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY609, 619-22 (National Bureau of Economic Reserve
ed., 1962) (arguing that "the incentive to invent is less under monopolistic than under competitive
conditions").
74. Merges & Nelson, supra note 70, at 873- 77.
75. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGALSTUD. 247, 263
( 1994) (arguing that benefits of diversity flowing from a competitive approach to innovation may outweigh
the waste of duplicative efforts; and to the extent there is waste, it is not the sort with which public policy
should be concerned).
76. Fostering Cumulative Innovation, supra note 56, at 825.
77. One important way that monopolies may add costs to innovation is by the commonly known feature
of dead weight loss. Under general principles of supply and demand, as the price of a good declines the
amount of demand for the good will increase. A firm maximizes profits by selling at a point where marginal
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monopoly situation works to raise the cost of access to patented subject matter. Where
multiple rights must be acquired, as may typically be the case in situations of complex
and/or sequential innovation, the cost of the acquisition of rights may quickly increase
beyond the cost that would have been paid in a competitive environment. The more
rights that need to be acquired, the greater the premium that must be paid to engage in
innovation. As the premium increases, the more it eats into the profits expected to
result from engaging in innovation. Hypothetically, there comes a point at which the
costs involved may suppress altogether the economic motivations to pursue an
innovation.
2. Additional Innovation Suppressive Costs
Inherent in the use of property rights are another set of innovation suppressive
costs 78-the transactional costs ofinformation 79 and negotiation. In general terms, to
transact in property rights parties must form an understanding of the legal relationships
between one another as well as an understanding of the subject matter-the thing-that
is the nexus of the relationship between the parties. 80 In addition, the parties must form
an accurate understanding of the respective value of the rights, avoiding exorbitant
holdout rents and, where relevant, free riding. Inefficiencies in these tasks add costs
to the transaction and make the movement of property rights from lower valued to
higher valued uses less efficient.
In an influential article, Michael Heller describes a tangible property scenario
where transaction costs attending the bundling of various rights are sufficiently high
that ordinary market mechanisms have difficulty aligning rights so that property is put
to its best use.81 By contrast to the catastrophic overuse that characterizes communal

revenue, i.e., the amount a firm earns from the sale of an additional unit, equals its marginal cost, i.e., the
cost incurred in producing the additional unit. Thus, where marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost,
a firm should produce more output. Conversely, where the marginal cost is greater than the marginal
revenue a firm has lost money by overproducing the good.
In a competitive environment, the presence of multiple sellers fixes marginal revenue at the price
set in the market. In the absence of competition or the availability of equivalent or substitute goods,
however, marginal costs may remain the same, but the point at which marginal revenue equals marginal
cost (and profits are therefore maximized) is at a level of output less than what would be produced in a
competitive market. Consequently, a profit maximizing firm that has a monopoly or near monopoly will
sell fewer goods at a higher price. The dead weight loss is seen through the loss of output. Those who
would have purchased the additional goods at lower prices cannot do so and some profit that could have
OF
been realized by the monopolist is not realized. See generally DONALDS.CHISUMETAL.,PRINCIPLES
PATENTLAW57-62 (3d ed. 2004).
78. See discussion supra note 55.
79. For a lengthy theoretical discussion of information costs in intellectual property, see Clarisa Long,
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465 (2004). For a description of some rules
the United States Patent System employs to reduce information costs during claim interpretation, see
Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS& CLARKL. REV.
57 (2005). For discussion on how the Patent Office can remedy information cost problems, see Joseph
L. REV.177
Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS&CLARK
(2005), and Petherbridge, supra note 67.
80. Long, supra note 79, at 472-73.
81. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV.L. REV. 622, 623 (I 998).
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ownership in the tragedy of the commons, 82 a tragedy ofunderuse, a "tragedy of the
anticommons," might arise when enough multiple owners have the right to exclude
others from a scarce resource.
More recent works have hypothesized that a growing number of property rights
in the form of patents is causing an accretion of transaction costs that may be
attenuating innovation in the life sciences. 83 In this view, legislative and university
policies create an environment of highly fragmented rights, which in the life sciences
combine with a practical requirement of complex sequential innovation to coalesce into
a perfect storm of innovation destroying transaction costs. Thus, legislative policy
choices given force by the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act 84 and the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 (creating the Federal Circuit) contribute to the tragedy by
encouraging the formal propertization of publicly funded invention and discovery. 85
Thus, for example, ifa large and diverse population of property owners through
patents directed to nucleic acid sequence fragments each had the right to exclude others
from the use of part of a gene for a receptor important in the study of a disease
pathology and treatment, it might be very costly to gather all of the licenses necessary
for one or a small number of entities to engage subsequent innovation. 86 To the extent
that subsequent research and development, marketing approval, and manufacturing and
sales is very expensive, pursuing subsequent innovation may be too risky for firms that
cannot obtain all the necessary permissions. A risk enhanced by the knowledge that
there is rarely, if ever, a guarantee that subsequent research and investment will
produce a commercially marketable product.
The cost of innovation in such an environment may be further enhanced by the
strategic behavior of upstream entities. By encouraging patenting at this level, the
thinking goes, innovation policy inserts large numbers of broad upstream rights far
removed from widely demanded commercial products. 87 Because universities and

82. See Garret Hardin. The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE1243 (1968).
83. See. e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE698 ( 1998); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca Eisenberg, BayhDole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW& CONTEMP.PROBS.289 (2003); Arti K. Rai &
James Boyle, Synthetic Biology: Caught between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons,
PLoS BIOLOGY,(forthcoming), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=94l 732 (follow "go to Document
Download" hyperlink; then follow "Stanford Law School" hyperlink) (describing the potential for
transaction cost problems in the developing field of synthetic biology).
84. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 296 (arguing that legislative innovation policies neglected
to take into account distinctions between upstream inventions directed to basic research or fundamental
discoveries that enable future scientific investigation and downstream inventions, which lead more directly
to commercial products).
85. A result that, if true, is especially perverse considering the purpose of these policy initiatives was
to promote the use of inventions and discoveries produced with public funding for the public good. See
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) (stating that the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act is "to promote the utilization of
inventions arising from federally supported research or development"); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 83,
at 290 ("The sponsors of the legislation believed that grantee ownership of patent rights ... was necessary
to motivate private investors to pick up where the government sponsors left off and transform new
discoveries into commercial products.").
86. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 699, for a very similar example.
87. See Rai, supra note 7, at 135-36 (explaining that this has had a "dis-integrati[ng]" effect on
innovation in the life sciences; where once pharmaceutical firms were vertically integrated houses of
innovation, managing rights from early in the innovation process, the economic change wrought by
legislation has dis-integrated this older innovation process).
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smaller firms are less likely to produce therapeutic end products, they typically seek
to appropriate the benefits of their rights by seeking some portion of the revenue
expected if others successfully innovate from their upstream inventions and discoveries
to downstream commercial products. This task is typically accomplished by licensing.
In an atmosphere of uncertainty concerning the feasibility of any commercial
therapeutic (or other widely demanded product) these licensing transactions can be
very costly. 88 Thus, at least hypothetically, problems of information, strategic
behavior, and the erroneous prediction of the value of downstream products can
increase costs, thereby suppressing innovation and reducing its attendant social
benefits. 89
The following example(s) will help to illustrate how myriad rights could affect
innovation. Suppose an investigator at University X molecularly clones a
complimentary DNA ("cDNA") containing a portion of a gene encoding a receptor
important in an intracellular signaling pathway that has been linked to aberrant cell
growth, e.g., cancer. Assuming sufficient utility,90 novelty, and nonobviousness, the
cDNA would be patentable under the principles announced in Parke-Davis. 91 Suppose
a separate investigator at University Y isolates the genomic clone of the same, or a
highly homologous, gene, which contains the coding sequences missing from the
cDNA. In view of the law of written description and obviousness as applied to

88. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 700 (making this point). This uncertainty can be exacerbated
where negotiators have limited time, skills, and/or business acumen. See also Lorelei Ritchie de Larena,
The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 44 Hous. L. REV. (forthcoming) (at 44 of
draft on file with author). ("It is understandably difficult for technology transfer offices to have resources
to support the high-level knowledge of both law and business that is now necessary to responsibly
administer the university's intellectual property obligations .... ").
89. Both empirical and theoretical disputes exist concerning the impact of transaction costs on
innovation in the life sciences. A recent report by the National Research Council finds that an increase in
patenting activity generally has not been linked to a loss of social benefits. See NATIONALRESEARCH
COUNCILOF THENATIONALACADEMIES,A PATENTSYSTEMFORTHE 21 ST CENTURY29, 46-63 (Stephen
A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin, & Mark B. Myers eds., The National Academies Press 2004) [hereinafter A
PATENTSYSTEMFORTHE2 I ST CENTURY]. Other reports also suggest that in most cases patents may not
be significantly impeding research and development in the life sciences. See John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho,
& Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE,2002, 2003
(2005) ( concluding that the results of a survey of academic biomedical researchers offered "little empirical
basis for claims that restricted access to IP is currently impeding biomedical research"); John P. Walsh,
Ashish Arora, & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Innovation, in PATENTSIN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASEDECONOMY 285, 331-36 (Wesley M. Cohen and
Stephen A. Merrill, eds., National Academies Press 2003) (finding, inter alia that upstream rights do not
generally inhibit drug development). A theoretical basis for understanding these results is suggested by R.
Polk Wagner in Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, I 03
COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001-16 (2003), in which he describes an expanding information commons. The
empirical data is not, however, all one-sided. See Eric G. Campbell et. al., Data Withholding in Academic
Genetics: Data from a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 476-78 (2002) (reporting some level of data
withholding in life sciences research).
90. The utility requirement is still properly understood as very low and generally presents a low bar to
patentability. See generally In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1369- 78 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating the standard
for utility and applying it to a patent application directed to expressed sequence tags (ESTs) or gene
fragments).
91. See Parke-Davis &Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 102-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affdinpart, 196
F. 496,498 (2d Cir. 1912).
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molecular technologies and products, this too is likely to be patentable. 92 Finally,
imagine that an investigator at start-up Z purifies the polypeptide comprising the
receptor. This also is patentable subject matter and could be independently patented
by the start-up.
At this point, a commercially viable therapy to treat cancer is far off. Already,
however, each of these patentees respectively has the right to block all possible uses
of each of the sequences of the cDNA, the genomic DNA, and the purified
polypeptide. A pharmaceutical firm that wants to test its library of small molecule
compounds might have to negotiate three licenses: two for access to the DNA
necessary to synthesize the protein, and a third to work with the protein. In each case,
the license must be negotiated in an environment of relatively poor information about
whether there even exists a chemical or small molecule in their library that antagonizes
or agonizes the receptor. And even if such a molecule is found, there is no guarantee
that it would have the desired effect on cell growth. Moreover, if a molecule that
suppresses aberrant cell growth is found, it would still have to pass through animal, and
later human, testing to meet the marketing approval requirements of the FDA.
In the event that a blockbuster is not identified by the foregoing approach, future
research would need to be conducted. This would require permissions for each of the
entities that would perform the research. These agreements, too, would be negotiated
in an environment where little is known about the likelihood of success and the
potential benefits. This research might discover additional molecules in the signaling
pathway, which would themselves be patented. Other receptors that interact with the
first receptor may be discovered, as may be genes and gene products that are activated
when the receptor is agonized. Each gene and polypeptide could be patented in whole
or in part by the various participants in the research. As with the earlier patents, each
of these patentees has the right to block all possible uses of the patented subject matter.
Still later research might involve the creation of cell lines or transgenic animals
missing or expressing altered forms or the various components of the signaling
pathway. Each line and animal, as well as the techniques for making them, is protected
by the property rules of the patent system. Where the therapy ultimately consists of
complicated recombinant vectors, e.g., gene therapy, rights in the DNA sequences
comprising the coding, regulatory, and other elements of the vectors may have to be
collected. Where the therapy is complex macromolecule, such as a biologic, the
methods of expression, construction, and/or purification, as well as those of
administration can all be expected to be subject to patent protection.
III. A THEORY OF OPEN LIFE SCIENCE
Relatively few would argue with the contention that there is value, both economic
and moral, in addressing the healthcare needs of the economically disenfranchised
groups discussed previously. 93 Most would probably also agree that intellectual
property laws are not the sole cause of the lack of access, distribution, and allocation

92. See, e.g., In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (1993); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Arti K.
Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKEFOREST L.
REV. 827, 831-41 (1999).
93. See discussion supra Part I.
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of healthcare resources to the groups described above. However, to the extent that the
economics of the current framework of innovation is not producing drugs and therapies
directed to important and devastating diseases-particularly
if the lack of production
flows from a disproportionately small investment in comparison to the impact of the
diseases-it is worth considering other possible frameworks for innovation. 94
Moreover, the significance of patents in the life sciences does not appear to be on
the wane. Indeed, common sense dictates that patents will likely continue to increase
in prominence as a tool for organizing research and development in the field.
Acknowledging the significance of patents also means acknowledging that innovation
suppressive costs are unavoidable, which in turn, presents the question whether these
costs might be reduced. As a preliminary matter, one could ask whether the benefits
of a property-based legal infrastructure outweigh the costs inherent in such an
approach. This question has not been decisively answered, but at present it is probably
enough to say that there seems to be little evidence that the general application of a
property-based approach to innovation is incorrect as compared to a property-less
approach. If the established proprietary framework is not broadly incompetent, then

94. Others have confronted either this particular question or the more general question of whether
innovation on the whole might be improved with legal change or private reorganization. See, e.g., Stephen
M. Maurer et. al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer, I PLoS MED. 183,
183-85 (2004) (discussing the application of open source); Y ochai Benkler, Commons-Based Strategies
and the Problem of Patents, 305 SCIENCE1110, 1110 (2004); Amy Kapczynski et. al.,Addressing Global
Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEYTECH. L.J.
1031, 1091-1108 (2005) (describing equitable access licensing); David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's
Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 18 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 167, 224-26 (2004) (proposing
a National Biotechnology Database to force transparency of the licensing market to lower transaction costs
and move closer to a Coasian ideal); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed
Research Commons/or Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66
LAw & CONTEMP.PROBS.315, 427-30 (2003) (describing the parameters of a contractually reconstructed
research data commons); see also, e.g., Alliance/or Cell Signaling, supra note 7, at 706; The Synaptic
Leap, http://www.thesynapticleap.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2007) (providing an environment for online
research communities to connect and enabling open source biomedical research); International HapMap
Project, http://www.hapmap.org/datareleasepolicy.html.en
(last visited Jan. 22, 2007) (providing a
haplotype map of the human genome, this project seeks to make information produced by the project freely
available by requiring that "users must agree not to reduce others' access to the data, and to share the data
only with others who have made the same agreement."); Bi OS, http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/about/3.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2007) (employing an open source approach to foster innovation on biotechnology);
Bioinformatics.org, 2002 Organization Plan (2002), http://bioinformatics.org/about/plan-20020920.pdfat
5-19 (providing an open access/source resource for bioinformatics); Open Bioinformatics Foundation,
www.open-bio.org/wiki/main_page
(last visited Feb. 4, 2007) (providing support for open source
bioinformatics). An additional example is reflected in the Brief of Twenty-Four Intellectual Property Law
Professors as Amicus Curiae, supporting KS R's petition for writ of certiorari in KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350, (U.S. May 12, 2005) (arguing for a change in the standard for patentability).
Legislative means have also been proposed. See, e.g., Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977,
I 10th Cong. (2007) (directed to prohibiting the patentability of nucleotide sequences). Many of the
suggestions and proposals in the cited references have merit, and it is not the plan of this Article to dissect
and discuss them all. As is evident in later sections of the Article, to the extent the Article reflects a
preference it is likely in the direction of private ordering because it permits particularized arrangements that
offer a precision that is sometimes difficult to capture with legislative interference or other top-down legal
change.
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the application of a principle of reasonable precaution argues that any modifications
or additions to the current innovation paradigm be tailored to not unreasonably disrupt
the basic proprietary framework. At this level of resolution, the question becomes
what, if anything, can be done to refine the current innovation infrastructure in a way
that complements the current use of property rights, but also creates the possibility that
certain types of innovation will be more likely to occur and makes more widespread
access to innovation that does occur.
One refinement might come from reconsidering the way in which property rights
are deployed. Instead of conceptualizing property as, primarily, a tool of exclusion,
property could sometimes be deployed as a tool of inclusion. As discussed below, the
liberal access to rights that might follow can in some cases be expected to encourage
innovation.

A. Open Science
At the outset, some explanation of the term "open science" is appropriate. As used
here, it refers to a framework for innovation directed to providing liberal, low-cost
access to intangible (patented) property for the purpose of the creation and accretion
of new and useful information and materials that meaningfully advance the state of
knowledge and skill in a relevant technological area. In general terms, open science
is meant to reflect a socially sensible approach to innovation by recognizing that in
some cases the grant of liberal rights to use certain property is a superior approach to
innovation than an approach that vests an exclusive right in a single firm. As discussed
in more detail below, the use of the term here is not meant to suggest that anyone and
everyone should always have the right to use all relevant property in every situation.
Rather, an open science approach is properly tailored based on a consideration of the
facts and circumstances.
As described, open science depends on relatively liberal, low-cost access to
property rights. That being the case, as a preliminary matter it is important to consider
the question whether such liberal, low-cost access is harmful to innovation. The
general answer is almost certainly that it depends. Surely some innovation will happen
in the absence of patents, so removing the possibility of a patent would at worst slow
down the pace of innovation. Thus, the detriment would presumably be mostly
concentrated on those who needed the advances sooner. However, the animating
concern here is directing innovation to seemingly underserved markets. In cases where
relatively little work is being done, we might conclude that the contemporary
framework has not encouraged the desired level of productivity. Thus, liberalizing
access, at a minimum, might be expected to be no worse than the current state of
affairs.
The next question to consider is whether liberalizing access could promote
innovation. This answer, too, is almost certainly that it depends. Reducing the cost of
access to rights could be expected to lower the cost of innovation-potentially
encouraging innovators who might have been sitting on the sidelines due to concerns
over the access to rights. Thus, alternative means of funding the work might become
more feasible, e.g., not-for-profit pharmaceutical companies, government, or United
Nations funded research might be performed on a contractual basis. Moreover, where
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upstream rights are involved, potential returns might not be prohibitively diminished,
especially where patents remained available for end products or therapies.
Creating a framework of liberal access to property rights may have additional
innovation-enhancing benefits in the life sciences. As described in more detail below,
some benefits may flow from general features of innovation in the life sciences, while
others may flow from the ability to achieve at least some innovative advances through
the use of large, loosely organized peer research collaborations.
There are several features ofinnovation in the life sciences, which suggest that an
open science approach may sometimes be appropriate. First, innovation in the life
sciences can be highly cumulative. Upstream inventions may feature prominently in
dO\vnstream in.'lovation. In situations where considerable work remains to be done to
connect a new discovery with a broadly useful product or therapeutic, it can make
sense to provide liberal access to the use of the discovery. 95 Moreover, in cases
involving upstream inventions that are of broad technological importance, rights
attaching to such inventions could operate as powerful tools to organize downstream
innovation. 96
Second, innovation in the life sciences is characterized by significant platform
susceptibility. There are a broad variety of platform technologies that are capable of
serving as common research resources. Many of these platform technologies are
capable of providing both a structural and functional context for research and for the
production of a wide variety of important innovation outputs. Some examples include
molecular systems, e.g., cloning vectors, molecular libraries, expression cloning
systems, two-hybrid systems, and inducible expression systems. 97 Other examples
include cell lines, which provide an irritable structural and functional environment for
the reproduction and examination of any number of cellular processes and molecular
interactions. Yet other examples include transgenic animals, which can be precisely
tailored to express vel non a particular gene, to screen for genes important to particular
functions, to serve as broadly applicable disease models, and/or to serve as bio-reactors
for the production of important substances. The broad platform susceptibility of
innovation in the life sciences suggests that there will be cases in which innovation can
be improved by providing liberal, low-cost access to certain technologies.
Third, many of these platforms easily evolve in the hands of ordinarily skilled (or
less) individuals to serve important research goals. For example, cloning vectors may
play host to a wide variety of molecular clones. Expression cloning systems are
generally customizable to probe for clones across a wide range of species, tissues, and
states of cellular or organismal differentiation. Cell lines and transgenic animals can
be modified using ordinary techniques of gene introduction, ablation, and/or cellular
cloning 98 to express exogenous genes, ablate endogenous genes, introduce dominant

95. This makes sense whether or not one adheres to the view that centralization is the superior form of
organization. In some cases, it can make sense for a property owner to make liberal grants of the right to
use a patent, and perhaps even to include others in ownership.
96. The example of the receptor, discussed supra Part ll.B.2, provides at least one example. There are
numerous other examples, and new possibilities are ever arising.
97. See, e.g., Mutated steroid hormone receptors, methods for their use and molecular switch for gene
therapy, U.S. Patent No. 5,935,934 (filed May 30, 1995).
98. Notice of this common practice has reached even lay legal audiences. See Univ. of Rochester v.
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negative mutations, and express chimeric molecules. 99 Inducible expression systems
can be customized to express a massive array of genes, gene fragments, mutants, or
chimeric genes in a number of cellular and animal environments. The same is true for
transgenic animals, which can be customized to express vet non genes, mutations, and
chimeric molecules, in a constitutive or tissue-specific fashion. The fact that platform
technologies may be easily customized to serve a diverse array of research and
innovation interests suggests the desirability of providing liberal, low-cost access. This
may be particularly true where the range of uses is so broad that a rights holder may
not be aware of the breadth of uses, or even interested in other uses for purposes
beyond obtaining rents.
A fourth feature of innovation in the life sciences that makes an open approach
appealing is the historical presence of punctuating technologies. Some notable
examples include the microscope, the advent of molecular cloning technologies in the
1970s, the advent of Polymerase Chain Reaction in the 1980s, and the advent of
knock-out and knock-in technologies in the 1990s. The broad application of these
mostly discrete inventions has produced revolutionary advances in invention and
innovation in the life sciences. It may be particularly important that punctuating
technologies be made liberally available, because their application to a diverse set of
problems can be expected to produce across the board advances in information and
understanding.
Finally, there are problems in the life sciences that are both very large and very
complex. For example, a fundamental question in the life sciences is: What is the
network of interactions involved in intracellular signaling? 100 It is likely an
understatement of the complexity of this problem to analogize it to an attempt to
understand the complete workings of the infrastructure ofNew York City by looking
down at the city from the moon. The cost of resolving such complex and detailed
relationships may be beyond the reasonable temporal capabilities of any single firm,
even a large sophisticated pharmaceutical firm. Liberal sharing of access to
information and materials may be a reasonable (or perhaps even necessary) approach
to resolving questions of such high complexity.
B. To Open Science from Open Source

The idea of open source, and particularly the idea of using property rights to
leverage liberal access to materials and information that are typically legally protected

G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting an example of the use of modified cell lines as
a nontherapeutic platform for a screening system for therapeutic molecules), petition for reh 'gen bane
denied, 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
99. The range of uses may be impossible to fully describe, but these general categories include many
of the significant applications of these platforms.
I 00. See Taussig et al., supra note 7. The description of the AfCS project is revealing. The Alliance for
Cellular Signaling (http://www.afcs.org/) is a large-scale collaboration designed to answer global questions
about signaling networks. According to the Nature article, the overall goal of the group is to understand
the relationships between sets of inputs and outputs in signaling cells that vary both temporally and
spatially. This will involve an identification of the proteins that comprise the signaling systems, as well as
an assessment of time-dependent information and how it flows through the systems in both normal and
pathological states. Id. at 703.
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as "property," is most often discussed in the context of software and software
innovation. 101 Of the merits proffered in support of open source approaches, two are
particularly relevant to innovation in the life sciences: (I) the potential for reducing
innovation suppressive costs, and (2) the potential for efficiency gains available
because open source allows for a greater number ofinnovators working collaboratively
in a relatively decentralized environment.
In an eye-opening work, Yochai Benkler suggests that commons-based peer
production may be usefully deployed in not only software and distributed computing
contexts, but perhaps in other production contexts as well. 102 What matters, according
to Benkler, are the surrounding environmental conditions. The article distills
environmental conditions that, if present, may support larger scale collaborative
efforts. These conditions include: 103 (I) a pool of sufficiently skilled peer workers
who could be motivated to contribute to a project in which many are unlikely to
appropriate substantial monetary rewards; 104 (2) a project that can be sufficiently
modularized 105 so that its parts are sufficiently independent and discrete as to be
performable independently and flexibly by peer participants in accordance with their
availability and motivation; (3) a project in which modules can be sufficiently
granularized, 106 because, generally speaking, the smaller the cost of participation to
individual peer contributors, the broader the pool of peer contributors can be; and (4)
modules capable of being integrated at a relatively low cost. 107 Of particular
importance here is the avoidance of spurious or incompetent contributions and the
avoidance of unilateral appropriation of rights in the peer-produced subject matter.
The array of approaches to invention and innovation in the life sciences can be
quite diverse. In general terms, however, innovation in the life sciences differs in
several important ways 108 from the software or distributive computing situations that
largely animate the model in Benkler's piece. 109 These are discussed in more detail
below, but include the following: first, innovation in the life sciences has at least some

IOI. A number of articles and additional resources are available to the reader who would like more
information concerning open source in the context of software and other copyright-grounded contexts.
There are so many, that it is unreasonable to list them all. One beginning resource is the Free Software
Foundation, which supports the General Public License (GPL) versions of the archetypical "copyleft"
licenses. The Free Software Foundation, http://www.fsf.org, (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). Another resource
that addresses access to copyrightable materials is Creative Commons. Creative Commons has a number
of licenses, and its "Share Alike" licensing provisions appear to implement a "copyleft" approach to
licensing. Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
I 02. For this seminal article on peer production, see Yochai Benkler, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and
The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALEL.J. 369, 369 (2002).
I 03. I have recast Benkler's argument just slightly. The last three conditions I describe independently,
whereas Benkler presents these conditions collectively as significant to solving the problem of motivation.
Id. at 378-79.
I 04. Id. at 423-34.
I 05. Id. at 435.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 436.
I 08. But cf Opderbeck, supra note 94, at 181-200 (describing some physical and cultural barriers to the
application of an open source peer production model in the life sciences).
I 09. Recall that this discussion intentionally sets aside computer-driven approaches to innovation in the
life sciences, particularly those that rely on software development.
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high fixed costs including the cost of integration of materials; second, there may be a
relatively smaller number of peer participants; third, some innovation tasks in the life
sciences can exhibit problems of imperfect modularity and can sometimes be large
granule; and finally, at least until recently, innovation in the life sciences was more
subject to being appropriated by late comers than was innovation in the software
field. 110

I. Addressing Fixed Costs
Innovation in the life sciences can be characterized as having generally higher
physical costs than innovation in the software or distributed computing arenas. The
consequence of higher physical costs are primarily to limit the distribution of resources
available for research and development. As discussed in more detail below, this need
not be fatal to the application of an open science approach because first, not all work
has a high physical cost, and second, even where it may, the costs are frequently sunk
costs making lower cost sharing, or "piggybacking" possible in many circumstances.
Thus, while someone without access to a laboratory might not be able to perform some
of the "hands-on" work involved in experimentation, those with access to a lab may
readily, for example, set up in parallel to regular work additional sequencing or ligation
reactions. Excess reagents may be used, or alternatively, reagents at or near their
expiration date. Adding completed reactions to lanes on a gel that would otherwise
have gone unused takes little in terms of extra resources. Indeed, it may be better
viewed as an exercise in the conservation ofresources. In connection with the ligation
reactions, it may be true that extra competent cells would have to be used, but these too
expire in usefulness and the amounts used would ordinarily be minimal. There would
be little additional "hands-on" work as these cloning steps could be carried on in
parallel to the primary experiments that are the main focus of the researcher's day-today work. So too, for the minipreparations or other techniques, e.g, PCR, 111 that might
be used to identify the clones.
Other examples of low (additional) physical cost work include setting up (in
parallel or otherwise) additional amplification reactions for use in the unused wells of
a PCR run. Primers are cheap, on the order of $20 or less for many PCR usable
primers, 112 and can be easily shared between investigators. Moreover they can be used
in connection with PCR to achieve a dazzling and broad array ofuseful work. Again,
older or less trusted aliquots of polymerase enzyme may be available. In addition, if
the conditions for amplification are different for the primary work and the open,
collaborative work the runs for the latter experiments could be done overnight or at

110. Ifthere has been a change, it is an increase in software patents and the apparent refutation ofa view
held by some that software either was not or should not be patentable subject matter. Thus, software-related
inventions are as appropriable by later improvers as patented inventions.
111. PCR refers to Polymerase Chain Reaction, a technique for amplifying nucleic acid sequences. See
Kary Mullis & F.A. Faloona, Specific Synthesis of DNA in Vitro Via a Polymerase-Catalyzed Chain
Reaction, 155 METHODSENZYMATIC 335 (1987); Saiki et al., Primer-Directed Enzymatic Amplification
of DNA with a Thermostable DNA Polymerase, 239 Sci. 487 ( 1988).
112. See, e.g., Invitrogen Custom DNA Oligo Pricing, http://www.invitrogen.com/content.cfm?
pageid=88 (pricing oligos for general PCR purposes at less than$ 1.00/base) (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
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other times when the PCR machine would otherwise be idle. The resources used are,
again, relatively small; some overhead for power consumption (that is probably already
fixed), and a minimum amount of wear and tear accounted for in many cases by the
fact that most investigators or institutions have already sunk the cost of purchasing
service contracts from the vendor of the machines.
The above-mentioned techniques can be used to make constructs and libraries,
perform other cloning experiments, load constructs into expression systems, and
prepare vectors for introduction into cell lines and transgenic animals. Thus, these
foundational tools of molecular biology can be employed at relatively low cost; a cost
made lower in an environment of liberal, low-cost access to reagents.
With more complex reagents, such as cell lines, costs may rise. In many cases, the
cost of incubators and hoods, and perhaps even the cost of one or more well-trained
technicians will be sunk costs (e.g., in common resource areas and core labs). In some
cases, extra plates of cell lines can be plated in parallel with regular work. Introducing
recombinant constructs or applying available chemical or biological reagents can be
accomplished at relatively little extra cost. In other cases, perhaps involving primary
cells, or cell lines that are difficult to grow, the cost of obtaining and maintaining extra
plates can be higher. Also, where experiments involve very costly reagents, or hard
to obtain hormones, like RU-486, or powerful radioactive reagents, the cost of
experiments may increase.
Another example of complex reagents includes the broad array of possible
transgenic animals. Perhaps surprisingly, the cost of the production of transgenic
animals need not be prohibitively high, although their maintenance almost surely will
be. Many of the techniques already described, for example, molecular cloning,
sequencing, PCR, and cell culture, can be used to create and confirm the constructs
used to make transgenic animals. Moreover, many institutions have already sunk the
cost of the equipment rooms, injection apparatuses, and expertise, including dedicated
core scientists and/or technicians, to produce transgenic animals on a regular assembly
line basis. Thus, the opportunity for low-cost "piggybacking" exists in connection with
transgenic animals. However, even where the animals are produced, the cost of
maintaining the animals can be high. The animals need to be housed, fed, bred, and
culled. And while this often takes place in dedicated animal facilities (so the infrastructure costs are sunk), the cost to any individual investigator can be relatively high.
In university labs in particular, some level of collateral experimentation can often
exist comfortably within the confines of a primary investigator's budget. In other
cases, grant budgets or funds provided by the institution contain some level of
discretionary funding that could be used to support open science projects. In other
cases, one or more institutions could agree to cooperate on an open, collaborative
project and diffuse costs across several well-funded institutions.
In an open science approach, the integration of results to further the progress of
innovation will depend on at least two parameters. The first is the integration of
information, and the second is the integration of materials. Depending on the metalevel organization of the peer workers, the cost of integrating information may be
reasonable. For example, sequence data, images of gels, reports in the form of tables,
graphs, figures, and schematics, could be made available at a website dedicated to the
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project. 113 The website could be a place where data is maintained. Peer workers could
then check in to see the status of the project, contribute to the analysis of recently
posted results, share ideas for future directions, pick up future "assignments," or
organize loose collaborations to complete a next step. Indeed, as discussed below, the
relatively tiigh skill level of potential peer volunteers, combined with relatively small
114
In addition,
incremental inputs, may make for fairly easy integration ofinformation.
such a web-based collaboration may evolve to have "leaders" who exercise more
influence over the direction of the research than might be seen in a purely decentralized
regime. This could be a positive development, in that this group could guard against
spurious or erroneous contributions, refine future tasks for less knowledgeable
contributors, and avoid some inefficiencies by limiting duplicative work.
The cost of integrating materials may be higher, but in many cases not
insurmountable. For example, in some cases, it may be enough for a peer collaborator
to know the sequence information. The cost of having oligomeric primers or other
length sequences synthesized may be sufficiently trivial that it can be absorbed by a
peer collaborator. But even where it is not, the physical necessities of the transfer of
genetic information are very small. DNA can be transferred on a piece of paper, which
means that theoretically, it can be transferred nearly anywhere for the cost of a letter.
Moreover, if DNA in that form is undesirable, it is trivial to precipitate significant
quantities of DNA with a salt. Again, the act of transferring these materials take
nothing more than sending a letter or small package; a cost easily borne by a motivated
collaborator. Transferring other sorts of reagents can be more difficult, but only in
extreme cases should the problem be cost prohibitive. For example, investigators
regularly attend meetings. It would not take too much effort to bring along a cooler
115
Another way to
with a frozen aliquot of a cell line, or a breeding pair of animals.
efficiently transfer material is to make a deposit of, e.g., cells or clone-containing
bacteria, at the American Type Culture Collection. 116 In the case of transgenic mice
at least some could be deposited at The Jackson Laboratory. 117

113. Sequence data is already often made available through websites maintained by the National
Institutes of Health.
114. Note that this statement is not absolute. There may of course be difficulty on the fringes, where
the use of a particular reagent or the reproducibility of a particular experiment is particularly "handssensitive." This refers to a phenomenon sometimes observed on the ground in the life sciences in which
a particular experiment or reagent appears to be capable of being reliably used by only a small number of
individuals. Usually, this phenomenon is temporary and due to a poorly understood sensitivity parameter
in the technique that is discovered and corrected over time.
115. Naturally, there are logistical considerations, including laws regulating the transfer of certain
materials, which in some cases would have to be taken into account.
116. The American Type Culture Collection ("A TCC") stores and distributes biological materials such
as cell lines, bacteria, animal and plant viruses, and antisera. ATCC Mission, http://www.atcc.org/About/
AboutATCC.cfm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007). ATCC, a global nonprofit bioresource center, provides
"biological products, technical services and educational programs to private industry, government and
academic organizations around the world." Id. Its stated mission is ''to acquire, authenticate, preserve,
develop and distribute biological materials, information, technology, intellectual property and standards for
the advancement, validation and application of scientific knowledge." Id.
117. The Jackson Laboratory, located in Bar Harbor, Maine, is a non-profit biomedical research center
renowned for its collections of mutant and transgenic mice. See Facts About the Jackson Laboratory, a NonProfit Institution, http://www.jax.org/about/jax_facts.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
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Yet another way of integrating materials (and information) in an open science
environment is to establish cooperative projects in geographic areas with high
concentrations of peer workers. A prototypical example could be the Texas Medical
Center ("TMC"). At a minimum, 118 the TMC boasts three nationally renowned
institutions that are home to very large multi-department research and development
communities, Baylor College ofMedicine, 119 the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 120 and
the University of Texas Medical School. 121 Together, the three institutions support ( or
are supported by) many hundreds of primary investigators, many hundreds of postdoctoral fellows, hundreds of graduate students, hundreds of medical students, and
large numbers of technicians. Each institution is literally a stone's-throw or two from
the other. 122 The transfer ofall sorts of materials in this environment would take quite
literally no more than fifteen minutes-the amount of time it takes to cross the street.
Informal meetings, follow up questions on the nuances of techniques, or additional
information on results is easily conveyed over lunch, or at workshops directed to a
particular project. 123 Moreover, these three major institutions are complemented by
two other institutions that do significant amounts of biological and biomedical
research. Texas A&M University 124 with its research resources is approximately an
hour-and-a-half away by car, 125 and the University of Texas Medical Branch at
Galveston 126 is an hour's drive. It would be a small task for a motivated peer worker
to drive to or from College Station or Galveston to obtain materials useful to the
collaborative project. Thus, to the extent the integration ofresearch tools and materials
would be difficult when open collaborations take place over large distances, they might

118. This conservative view ignores all of the research talent at the several hospitals in the medical
center, such as Texas Children's Hospital.
119. See About Baylor College ofMedicine, http://www.bcm.edu/about/ (noting that in 2007, BCM was
ranked first in the country for research expenditures in biological science by the National Science
Foundation and thirteenth in National Institutes of Health funding) (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
120. The M. D. Anderson Cancer Center is one of the nation's top two cancer centers, and has a faculty
of over 1,200 who have attained the degree of either M.D. or Ph.D. The University of Texas M. D.
Anderson Cancer Center Profile, http://www.mdanderson.org/ About_ MDNWho _We_ Are/display.cfin?id
=29E3FCE1-2828-l lD5-8 I l 1005088603Al4&method=displayFull.
121. See University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston Research Expenditures by Unit I 9952004, http://www.uth.tmc.edu/factbook/2005/research/resunit.htm
(reporting research expenditures in
excess of $148 million in 2004) (last visited Jan. 22, 2007); University of Texas Health Science Center at
Houston NIH Awards by Unit 1995-2004, http://www.uth.tmc.edu/factbook/2005/research/nih.htm
(reporting over $70 million in NIH awards in 2004) (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
122. One throw from Baylor College of Medicine to each of the others. To get from the University of
Texas Medical School to the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, one probably needs two throws. To the extent
it would take more, it is because of intervening structures, not distance.
123. This would provide a nice complement to web-based integration of information by creating
additional channels to sharpen the information generally made available on the site.
124. See Texas A & M University Departments, http://www.tamu.edu/home/academics/departments
.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
125. See http://www.tamu.edu/ (College Station, Texas).
126. See UTMB Facts and Figures, http://www.utmb.edu/ia/facts.asp (reporting that "UTMB is a major
academic health center dedicated to health science education, patient care, research, and community
service") (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
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be better organized when connected to geographic areas that contain a larger pool of
potential peer workers. 127
Finally, while this article largely eschews computational aspects ofresearch and
innovation in the life sciences, it is worth noting that as computational biology begins
to make more significant contributions, at least that aspect of research and
development may begin to take on the more traditional attributes of the peer production
environment described by Benkler.

2. Peer Worker Potential
Another way in which innovation in the life sciences may differ from the
production of new software and a distributed computation model is that the pool of
peer workers may be smaller. 128 This may be compensated for by at least three aspects
of research and innovation in the life sciences, which set it apart from some other forms
of innovation. First, the pool of peer workers in the life sciences is characterized by
a high level of skill; both technical skill and breadth of knowledge. Nearly all of the
peer workers will have college degrees, and many will either have or be working
towards degrees as advanced as an M.D. or even a Ph.D. Many of these workers will
keep up with current cutting edge advances in the life sciences as a function of their
day jobs-being biomedical researchers. Thus, the knowledge and skill characteristics
of this peer group may result in better auto-organization and better quality
contributions.
Second, the pool of peer workers can be characterized as relatively stable. As
suggested above, these peer workers will not usually be hobbyists, rather, a description
of their "day job" includes constantly working toward being a smart contributor to life
sciences projects. Thus, the same skills they are paid to hone are the skills they can
bring to an open science collaboration. The stability provided by the income they
receive for being life sciences researchers will allow them to be long-term contributors
in an open science project. As their time with the project increases, the intellectual
memory and infrastructure they provide can enhance the quality of the work done in
pursuit of the project's goals.
A third reason to believe that a smaller pool 129 of more highly skilled peer
producers can operate in a life sciences theater is that this group may be especially
motivated to work on the project. In many cases, these individuals are life sciences
researchers because they view the work as being of high social and moral significance.
The norms of the field tend to include a belief that participants have committed
themselves to lower paying jobs in order to pursue what they view as socially and

127. While the Texas Medical Center presents perhaps the ideal geographic arrangement in the U.S.,
there may be other geographic locations where open projects could be based. For example, the San
Francisco area of California is home to several significant biomedical research institutions, as is the Boston
area of eastern Massachusetts. Other possible areas include New York City or Washington, D.C./Bethesda,
Maryland.
128. See Benkler, supra note 94, at 1110-11.
129. That the pool of peer workers on a life sciences project will be smaller than the pool of peer workers
participating in software or distributed computing contexts is an assumption, not a known (to the author)
fact. It may be that relatively large collaborations to solve important scientific and medical problems bring
together largernumbers of collaborators than at least some traditional (computational) open source projects.
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morally important work. To the extent these norms control, 130 they enhance stability
in participation, might provide for a net average greater contribution per peer worker,
and in any event may provide for less fickle peer workers than in other areas of
research. 131
3. Issues of Modularity and Granularity

Some innovation tasks in the life sciences can exhibit problems of imperfect
modularity and can sometimes be of large granule size. 132 While there is an element
of modularity in many innovation projects in the life sciences, heterogeneity exists.
Sometimes, certain tasks may need to be completed before later tasks, however,
modularizable, can be completed. Described most generally, a ,vide variety of
modules are capable of being worked on by any number of peer workers, but in some
cases, "earlier" modules must be completed before work can commence on "later"
modules. 133
Returning to our earlier examples, while any number of peer workers can
independently labor on the task of building an expression vector containing the gene
of interest, at least one expression vector must be completed before it can be
introduced to a cell line or an animal. While any number of peer workers could
conceivably then work on creating a transgenic animal, the animal must be successfully
produced and bred before it can be made widely available as, for example, a disease
model. Once the disease model is widely distributed, it can be used by a large number
of peer workers to test a range of chemical and biological therapies. Thus, in terms of
the production ofinnovation, the temporal relevance of some tasks, i.e., that they must
be completed before other tasks, can impact modularity. Naturally, this need not be
fatal to an open science innovation model as the creation of a molecular library, or an
expression vector, or a transgenic animal may constitute significant advances in and
of themselves. Instead, different states of modularity can be taken into account when

130. But cf Opderbeck, supra note 94, at 186-200.
131. This is not to say that there is no social conscience in other areas of technology and innovation.
Of course there is. However, the traditional norms of life sciences research actually emphasize the social
good of the work as a reason for participation and (whether factually true or not) as justifying less monetary
remuneration in general.
132. Modularity refers to the divisibility of the tasks of a project, and the extent to which they can be
performed independently and asynchronously. See Benkler, supra note 102, at 379. Granularity refers to
the size of the modules and how well the size of the modules corresponds to the motivations and capabilities
of the peer workers. Id.
I 33. I reiterate the qualification that modularity here is a matter of degree. A range of states of
modularity can exist in life sciences innovation. One criterion to determining the degree of modularity is
the extent to which there are multiple ways of reaching the ultimate advance. In cases where there are a
number of independent approaches to getting to the same innovative output, there may be fewer
bottlenecks; the result being that more of the larger problem can be worked on asynchronously. Thus, the
model described in the text has a sequential aspect that limits modularity somewhat depending on how one
defines the innovation output. However, other approaches, for example, rational drug design or synthetic
biology, may, at some point in the course ofinnovation, operate to improve the modularity of work involved
in the innovation by allowing different peer workers to work on different aspects of the problem, aspects
less accessible in the absence of a wholly different technical approach or model system.
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deciding whether an open science approach is likely to be a good idea, and if it is how
to tailor the approach to be most efficient.
The size of granules in life sciences innovation is varied. 134 Sequencing a gene,
cloning, setting up a PCR reaction, writing a paragraph of analysis of a figure, and
designing a set of primers are all fairly small-grain pieces of work. Sequence database
searches, translating data into web-publishable figures or graphs, scanning figures, and
performing some immunofluorescence or immunohistochemistry are also fairly smallgrain pieces of work for those with access and the relevant skill set. On the other hand,
the work of organizing and supervising an animal or clinical trial may be of much
larger granule size. In the life sciences, a rough rule of thumb might be stated: tasks
involving higher physical costs (especially where piggybacking is not possible) or
significant regulatory supervision are likely to have the characteristic oflarger granule
size. Finer granule sized tasks are characterized by lower physical costs because they
are inexpensive to begin with, because cheap "piggybacking" on existing infrastructure
is possible, or because such tasks are not subject to significant formal regulation.

4. Subsequent (Mis)appropriation
Taken together, the variety of possibilities revealed by the considerations of
physical cost, peer worker qualities, and details of modularity/granularity suggest that
any decision to use vel non an open science approach should depend on the facts and
circumstances. Up to this point, however, the discussion has proceeded on the
theoretical possibilities, and largely ignored the impact of the legal framework used in
connection with innovation in the life sciences. As noted earlier, 135 that legal
framework is one of property rights. And it is property rights that present both
problem and promise for any particular implementation of an open science approach.
On the one hand, the right to exclude conferred by the legal rules allows later comers
to appropriate investment made and innovation produced by others. 136 This may have
the effect of discouraging volunteer innovation and participation in an open science
project. 137 On the other hand, the legal rules create rights that have the potential of
creating an innovative momentum that could thwart unreasonable rent-seeking by
latecomers.
IV. TOWARD A PATENT-BASED OPEN SCIENCE FRAMEWORK
Part II presented a framework of innovation in which private, commercially
directed science stands to a significant extent on the shoulders of publicly funded basic
research performed by universities and research-oriented medical schools, and to some
extent by the federal government in the embodiment of, inter alia, the National

134. According to Benkler, varied granule size should not be generally fatal to peer production. Benkler,
supra note 102, at 379.
135. See discussion supra Part 11.B(discussing the legal infrastructure of innovation).
136. See discussion of blocking patents contained in supra Part 11.B. To the extent that innovation in
the life sciences is highly punctuated and reflects the broad application ofimportant platform technologies,
this problem could be particularly acute. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing punctuated nature of
innovation and platform technologies).
137. See Benkler, supra note 102, at 379.
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Institutes of Health. This framework prominently features the use of property rights
as a means of integrating public and private scientific research, and as a means of
encouraging the production of new and useful information and materials. As Part II
concludes, the ubiquitous use of property rights, while likely helpful, logically has an
impact on the path and progress of innovation.
In keeping with the animating concern of this Article, namely, whether, and ifso,
how, innovation might be directed to seemingly underserved markets in the context of
a ubiquitous property rights-based framework, Part III explored whether research
advances might be made in the life sciences in an "open science" framework. What
was notable about the described open science framework was the attenuation of
barriers of access to rights. The inunediate concern was whether research advances
could still be made in the life sciences in situations where the right not to be excluded
is liberally granted. Part III concluded that some research in the life sciences would
continue, and perhaps even flourish, in an environment where liberal access was
promoted.
The conclusions reached in Parts II and III serve as important signposts when it
comes to addressing the practical questions of: How might a patentee, particularly a
university or research-oriented medical school that wants to encourage broad use of
patented subject matter to promote certain types ofinnovation, do so? Is there a legal
framework that could be used to support an open science approach to innovation?
In view of Parts II and III, a legal framework useful for imposing open science
should have certain features. First, it should be concerned with attenuating innovation
suppressive costs, but remain alert to preserving as much as possible private incentives
to innovate. In the prototypical cases of innovation directed to markets that are
perceived as having low near-term commercial value, the concern that incentives to
produce innovation will be attenuated in a practically significant way by promoting
liberal access to rights and materials is probably not that significant. Nonetheless, the
legal means used to impose liberal access to patented subject matter should seek to
preserve as much as possible market incentives to produce innovation.
Second, the legal framework should be concerned with promoting efficiency gains.
In prototypical cases, where the market-based incentives to produce innovation seem
already relatively low, reducing innovation suppressive costs may, in and of itself
produce efficiency gains. However, as discussed above, very liberal access could also
promote positive efficiency gains through the use oflarge, loosely organized collaborations.
Third, the legal framework used should ''understand its place" in an otherwise
ubiquitous property rights-based framework. That is, it should complement, and to the
extent it is an imperfect complement, it should at least "fit in." Thus, the legal
framework should strive to limit unpredictable, and potentially innovation-harmful,
externalities from its use. 138

138. Indeed, this concern presents a potentially significant hurdle for a pure "patentleft" approach, i.e.,
leveraging patent rights to force the immediate and perpetual donation to the public of all innovation that
derives from the use of a particular property. Specifically, the concern is that unpredictable externalities
may ripple well beyond the boundaries of the subject matter over which the framework was initially
imposed to the detriment of innovation in other subject matter. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 94
(describing an elaborate cross-licensing arrangement as a prophylactic to this effect); Sara Boettinger &
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Finally, the framework should be relatively easy to impose and operate. It should
be relatively clear, predictable, and certain. And, while one size may not fit all, the
legal framework should be tailored to deemphasize costly, complex, and sophisticated
licensing agreements that may be difficult to develop, understand, and enforce broadly,
in favor of a more "wait-and-see" approach to the appropriation of commercial value
from innovation.
As set forth in more detail below, the above-described features of an open science
legal framework may be usefully imposed through a servitude. The use of a servitude
draws on a "prospect" theory of innovation, but complements it with open access
principles to alleviate the cost difficulties associated with having a single (and perhaps
particularly unskilled entity) exercising an unnecessary controlling influence on the
methods and approaches to downstream innovation.
While the form of private ordering described below may be surprising at first
glance, it is based on familiar principles of property law. Its novelty comes from its
combination of existing elements, which to the author's knowledge have yet to be
tested in a real world context. Thus, what follows is necessarily a broad initial sketch
that will need to be further evaluated and particularized before widespread implementation.

A. Establishing a Patent Servitude
By statute, patents are defined as having the attributes of personal property, 139
albeit with a strong emphasis on the rights of exclusion 140 and alienation. 141 Thus, a
"patent servitude" presumably falls into the formalistic category of personal property
servitudes. Historically, recognized personal property servitudes seem to be relatively
rare, 142 and an in-depth discussion concerning the general nature and enforceability of
personal property servitudes is beyond the scope of this Article. 143 What is worth
pointing out, however, is that while the property rights conferred by a patent may be
different from some other forms of property, the rights that attend patents should, like
other property rights, be crafted and justified by exogenous public policy concerns.
Thus, the formalistic label is not decisively helpful in understanding whether a certain
property right should be part of the bundle owned by any particular patentee. The
answer to that question turns on economic realities, current economic sensibilities, and
relevant policies. To the extent there has been some historical hostility to personal

Dan Burk, Open Source Patenting, I J. INT'L BIOTECH.L. 221 (2004) (attenuating this concern in part by
making improvements that fall outside the scope of the licensed patent subject to private appropriation
while improvements falling within the claims retain their open access character).
139. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
140. See Cont'! Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1908); Richard A. Epstein,
The Structural Unity of Real and Intellectual Property, PROGRESSON POINT, Oct. 2006,
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop I 3.24RAE _9 _26.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
141. See Epstein, supra note 140 (explaining that interference with the right to alienate is disruptive of
the efficient allocation of intellectual property rights).
142. However, they may be increasing in prominence. See Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property
Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1449, 1455-58 (2004).
143. However, for an interesting discussion, see id., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on
Chattels, 41 HARV.L. REV. 945, 945 (1928), and Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and
Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV.L. REV. 1250, 1250 (1955-1956).
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property servitudes, the complaints appear to have been grounded in policies against
restraints on alienation or restraints on trade, and have been in the context of the resale
of tangible goods (sometimes goods that were ostensibly covered by some form of
intellectual property). As such, these historical objections may not bear contemporary
scrutiny in the patent context. 144
There are at least two ways to frame the question of whether a patent servitude is
permissible. The first way proceeds from a sort of "property first" position: that
strong property rights generally attach unless public policy requires otherwise. From
that perspective, once any policy objections to patent servitudes are removed, 145
making a restricted grant of patent rights should be generally permitted. The second
way asks the question in a somewhat more positive fashion: whether on balance there
is good reason to allow a patent owner to make a restricted grant of patent rights.
As noted above, this Article is not an exegesis on the general nature and
enforceability of personal property servitudes. Nor does it present a complete
discussion on the nature and enforceability of equitable servitudes on patents. Thus,
although this Article does not assume a formal "property first" position, it does assume
that the public policies which support the property rights conferred by patent in the
United States and abroad are sufficiently defensible to justify the several centuries-long
history of recognizing what are surprisingly strong property rights. Accordingly,
whether the law should recognize a restriction on the right to not be excluded, or a
restriction in connection with the transfer of a patent turns on whether the restriction
offends the policies that justify making property of patents or offends some other
important public policy. Because restrictions should then stand or fall on their
particulars, this question is better addressed after further consideration of the patent
servitude.

B. Patent Servitudes in Operation
The purpose of the servitude is to create a common plan to advance research and
development around the subject matter of a particular patent or patents. A servitude
requires (1) the intentto bind successors to a restriction concerning property, (2) notice
of the restriction, and (3) that the restriction either touch and concern, 146 or, depending
on the view, that it not violate public policy. 147
For patents, the important elements of intent and notice of the restriction will in
many cases be fairly easily met. At the outset, it is worth noting that in many cases, the

144. See Robinson, supra note 142, at 1480-1515 (arguing that the traditional hostility to use and resale
restraints on personal property is misguided in both the common law and the intellectual property context
because the reasons for limiting an owner's right to impose post-transfer restrictions on use and resale are
more exceptional than commonly assumed); see also Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology
Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN.J. L. SCI. & TECH. 117, 167 (2004)(concluding that open source
biotechnology licensing "should not constitute [patent] misuse"). But cf Boettinger & Burke, supra note
138, at 225-31 (providing additional discussion of misuse in connection with biotechnology licensing
strategies).
145. See Robinson, supra note 142.
146. See, e.g., Dukeminier & Krier, PROPERTY 748 (6th ed. 2006).
14 7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3. I (2000) (discussing restatement servitude
requirements).
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acts which normally communicate notice in a tangible property case, e.g., writings
between a grantor and a grantee or lessee, will often be sufficient to communicate
notice in the case of patent servitudes.
In addition, the Patent Office acts as a recording office for ownership interests in
patents or patent applications. 148 Assignment of all or part of a right, title, or interest
in a patent or application can be recorded, as may other documents affecting title. 149
Thus, unless the director was to object, a patentee or prospective patentee may record
at the patent office a "master deed" reflecting the restrictions placed on the patent.
Accordingly, any party seeking a grant of rights from the patentee would naturally be
expected to examine the ownership of the patent and should thereby have constructive
notice of any restrictions.
There are other ways in which notice of the restrictions could be conveyed. For
example, the restrictions could be placed in the written description of the patent itself,
or could be added to an issued patent by the use ofa terminal disclaimer. 150 Moreover,
where a university commits a patent to an open science strategy, notice of the
restriction on the patent and the common plan or scheme could be made well known
by its advertisement in connection with the mission of the institution, on frequently
visited websites, materials produced by the technology transfer office, or through news
stories generated by the institution's public relations department. 151 In another form,
notice could be provided by referencing the patent and its restrictions in scientific
publications pertaining to the patent's subject matter, as well as on posters and slides
for talks presented at relevant scientific conferences. Also, materials, information
sheets, protocols, sequence deposits, and the like could all be marked with the patent 152
and corresponding restrictions.
Obviously, it remains a concern that someone who would use a patent might not
realize that he or she is using it, and hence, may not learn of the restriction. Thus, this
is a problem of understanding the full scope of the thing to which the restriction
attaches. One suspects that there could be situations where this presents a problem.
However, patent law has a number of doctrines that are directed to clarifying the
boundaries of the property. Plus, in the case of scientific research in the life sciences,
notice of the boundaries of the property will be readily apparent in at least some
significant set of cases, e.g., nucleic acid and amino acid sequences and other chemical
compositions.
Accepting that in life sciences research a patent user is likely to recognize that it
is using patented subject matter, there are several reasons why notice of a common plan
for the development of patented subject matter might be implied for issued patents

148. 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
149. 37 C.F.R. § 3.11 (2006).
150. 37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (2006). It is worth noting thatthis is a bit ofa novel use ofa terminal disclaimer.
Traditionally, a terminal disclaimer is used to disclaim a claim or to dedicate to the public some part of the
term of a patent. Id. However, depending on the nature of the restriction, it may be properly characterized
as dedicating to the public some part of the property rights conferred by a patent. Alternatively, to the
extent that one purpose of terminal disclaimers is to provide notice of a change in the default rights
associated with a patent, making the restriction public through this means appears to make sense.
151. This would be easy enough to apply in the context of a major university, medical school, or center
for research. See, e.g., supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Texas Medical Center).
152. See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2000).

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 373 2007

374

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:2

directly connected to a line ofresearch. First, the institutional players, like universities
and firms, are a patent savvy group. Second, scientists and the firms that employ them
are actively engaged in scouring publications to identify and incorporate advances that
complement their own research goals. Given the documented increase in patenting in
the life sciences, it should be nearly a default understanding in the industry that
significant advances and discoveries are likely be patented. 153 The interconnectedness
of the tools and information used with a particular line of research makes it unlikely
that patents of any significance will be missed by the relevant parties. 154 Finally, even
if it were possible for a firm to argue that it was unaware of a particular patent or a
restriction on a patent, that lack of knowledge is easily remedied by a letter from
general counsel.
The next issue that must be approached concerns the nature of the servitude.
Given the contractual qualities of servitudes, there are a wide variety of choices in both
scope and term. In keeping with the premise that these covenants should be simple,
having only a few different forms may be superior in terms of clarity and
predictability. 155 I describe below some general approaches.
Broadly speaking, the ideas for "open" restrictions described below vary in either
term or scope. Variations in term range from limited to the life of the underlying
patent, i.e., whatever remains of the patent term, to indefinite in duration. The use of
a property owners association is also possible. In such cases, a vote of the requisite
number of owners might be sufficient to terminate the servitude. Moreover, in any
event, the term of a restriction may come to an end for any of the common law reasons
for terminating a servitude, e.g., merger, release, abandonment, changed conditions,
etc.
Variations on scope deal with the degree of openness of the restriction. As
described below, they range from promising not to exclude grantees or successors from
the practice of the underlying patented subject matter to-along the lines of more

153. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (setting out the increase in TIOs and university
patenting).
154. For example, if a major medical school were to make it publicly known that all of some number of
its patents directed to aspects of skin development and differentiation were going to be made openly
accessible, it is hard to imagine that any private research firms engaged in the study of skin cells would long
remain ignorant of that information.
155. While a contract approach might be thought of as generally providing more precision in the
allocation of rights, a property-based framework can provide a clarity, a breadth of enforceability, and a
predictability that can lack in contract. The advantages of these features ofa property-based approach may
be particularly pronounced where the future is uncertain. For example, the long evolutionary period of the
law of servitudes has through the selective pressures of the common law process (e.g., efficiency, morals,
justice, precedent) refined a set of default parameters for the construct. The parameters include guidance
concerning what circumstances are necessary and appropriate for a restriction on the use of property to be
lifted. There are a number of ways in which servitudes can be terminated. A nonexclusive list includes:
merger, release, abandonment, !aches, changed conditions, and relative hardship. Another way a servitude
may be terminated is by a release or recission process implemented by a property owner or property owners
association with the power to enforce the covenant. Many of the listed theories of termination allow for the
constant reevaluation of the benefits and burdens of the servitude, and the termination of the servitude
should the facts and circumstances so demand. Moreover, a restriction bound to and dependent on property
expires with the property, tying the term of the servitude nicely to the legislatively determined optimal
duration of the property.
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traditional open source licensing-promising
not to exclude grantees or successors
from practicing the underlying patented subject matter plus all improvements
developed through the use of the underlying patented subject matter.
To illustrate the ideas further, it is useful to consider their depiction in some
examples. In each of the following examples, the servitudes are created in connection
with the transfer of rights in a patent or patents and the transfer could take the form of
including a grantee in some significant right of ownership. Thus, the patentee might
convey a joint undivided right to exclude. In another variation, the patentee-grantor
may wish to convey the joint undivided right not to be excluded, including the power
to let others into the right.
In some cases, the patentee-grantor might want to be sure to either retain the right
to exclude, or transfer it to a central entity, e.g., a property owners association. The
reason for retaining the right to exclude or transferring it to a central entity is purely
formal; the joinder doctrine of the patent law makes enforcement against infringers
difficult where many own the right to exclude. 156 There will surely be cases where
dispersing this right too will make sense. In each of the following examples, the
"conveyed property" refers to that defined by the scope of the claims.
Example l
Not surviving the expiration of the conveyed property, the rights conveyed are subject
to the restriction that no grantee or successor in interest will exclude any other grantee
or successor in interest from the use of the conveyed property, or the making, using,
or selling of any tangible embodiment substantially comprising the conveyed
property.

Example 2
Not surviving the expiration of the conveyed property, the rights conveyed are subject
to the restrictions that no grantee or successor in interest will exclude any other
grantee or successor in interest from the use of the conveyed property and any
improvements built thereon, or the making, using, or selling of any tangible
embodiment of the conveyed or improved property.

Example 3
The rights conveyed are subject to the restriction that no grantee or successor in
interest will at any time exclude any other grantee or successor in interest from the use
of the conveyed property, or the making, using, or selling of any tangible embodiment
substantially comprising the conveyed property.

Example4
The rights conveyed are subject to the restriction that no grantee or successor in
interest will at any time exclude any other grantee or successor in interest from the use

I 56. Thereafter, the right could be transferred. The potential problem with making the right to exclude
commonly owned is that the patent laws have been construed to require the agreement of each owner of that
right in order to enforce the patent in an infringement litigation. See Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135
F.3d 1456, 1472 (Fed. Cir. I 998) (Newman, J., dissenting)(noting the court's holding that joint inventors
own an undivided interest in a patent as tenants in common).
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of the conveyed property and any improvementsbuilt thereon, or the making, using,
or selling of any tangible embodiment of the conveyed or improved property.
In Example 1, the restriction is temporally limited to the term of the patent. Thus,
in the event that the restriction does not terminate for any of the default reasons during
the life of the patent, it will still end when the patent ends. The consequence of this
restriction is to create a period of open access that will be something less than twenty
years. By extracting a promise from grantees that they will not exclude other grantees
from practicing the claimed subject matter, the patentee has created liberal access not
only to the claimed subject matter, but also to that class of improvements that directly
employ the claimed subject matter. 157
By way of illustration, assume that a researcher at university X clones a gene
important in the life cycle of a species of worm responsible for lymphatic filariasis.
The gene might, inter alia, be useful for expressing an antigen for a vaccine or for
incorporation in a gene therapy vector. The restriction of Example 1, allows
institutions and researchers who become grantees to use the gene (and assuming it is
claimed the gene product) for a significant period of time, with a greatly reduced
concern that their use will be enjoined and their disposition ofresources wasted. Thus,
to the extent that a vaccine or a gene therapy flows through the gene or gene product,
it may be pursued competitively by both public and private scientists (who become
grantees). Moreover, where something of therapeutic value is generated before the
restriction expires, if it uses the gene or gene product it can be manufactured and sold
by any grantee during the life of the original patent.
during this
Importantly, however, assuming that advances-improvements-made
period met the statutory requirements, they would remain patentable. This allows
grantee improvers some expectation of appropriation. First, against those who are not
grantees, 158 and after the restriction ends against all infringers. Thus, in Example 1,
after the property that is the basis for the restriction ends the restriction too will end
and improvement patents can be asserted against former grantees.
Some would presumably question the judgment of allowing those who were at one
time free to practice the patent, to later be held liable as infringers. There are a few
reasons, however, why this need not be a great concern. First, if, during the period of
the restriction, a competitor was competitive, it should have made advances and should
have been able to obtain patents. Thus, a competitive grantee should have some
leverage when dealing with other grantees after the restriction expires. Second,
because there will be plenty of notice that the restriction will end, grantees should have
ample time to organize their affairs through agreements, mergers, etc. Third, some
grantees might be willing to make improvements available using the restriction; this
keeps certain subject matter open. This could be a particularly competitive strategy
for universities or peer collaborations that may be highly motivated to maintain access

157. In other words, the grantees all have permissions--or licenses-to use this particular type of
improvement.
158. Note that it should be relatively easy to become a grantee, especially if the right to include others
in ownership is liberally granted. While this will suppress appropriation during the grant, it is a convenient
mechanism of autoenforcement. Those faced with a claim of infringement can probably get someone to
include them in ownership and thereby avoid a suit for infringement. To be included in ownership, the
competitor will become subject to the servitude.
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to fundamental technologies. Finally, ifa grantee is so noncompetitive that they cannot
obtain patents on improvements or make a technical or business contribution sufficient
to maintain access to rights after the restriction expires, perhaps the right thing is for
that firm to direct its resources toward other projects.
The restriction in Example 2 builds on the restriction in Example 1 as follows: If
the restricted property is ''used" in the practice of an improvement, it is made liberally
accessible by the restriction in both Examples I and 2. If the restricted property is
"used to get to" an improvement, but the improvement does not also employ the
restricted subject matter in its operation then the improvement would be made open
only by the restriction of Example 2. The restriction reflected in Example 2 is, like
that of Example 1, limited in duration to the term of the patent.
To illustrate, consider our earlier example with a slight specification. Assume also
that the cloned and patented gene encoded a receptor. There might be agonists or
antagonists for the receptor that could serve as a chemotherapeutic to suppress the
growth of the parasite. Alternatively, study of the receptor might reveal a significant
signaling pathway and molecules important to the growth and development of the
parasite. Both sets of molecules present potentially useful targets for future research
and various forms of treatment.
Assuming the scope of the claims of the patent to the gene and gene product did
not go beyond the molecules, rights in grantee improvements in the form of agonists,
antagonists, or other signaling molecules, etc., would not be made liberally available
by the restriction of Example 1. However, assuming that the claimed subject matter
was used in experiments to discover and purify the agonists, etc., the restriction
reflected in Example 2 would make rights in such improvements liberally available.
Again, only for the term of the patent. Thus, once the patent expires, the points
discussed in connection with Example 1 pertain here as well.
Examples 3 and 4 reflect restrictions similar to those reflected in Examples 1 and
2, respectively. The modification is one of term. The restrictions reflected in
Examples 3 and 4 are facially unlimited in duration although they could always
terminate by any of the default reasons for termination, or, if one were used, by the
decision of a property owners association. What is particularly notable about the
restriction reflected by Example 3 is that it provides for something of a perpetual
"practicing the prior art defense" against grantees and successors--one that is not
available in the background patent law. 159 While it would not include later ( after patent
expiration) entrants, the advantage of earlier (restricted) access might give grantees a
protective competitive advantage over later entrants, which could compensate for its
lack of prophylactic effect. The restriction reflected in Example 4 is the most extreme
presented in terms of forced access, but is of questionable forward depth depending on
how "built thereon" is interpreted.
As mentioned at the outset, to establish a servitude the restriction must, depending
on the view, either touch and concern or not be illegal, unconstitutional, or violative
of public policy. As discussed in more detail, there are reasons to think that the abovedescribed restrictions touch and concern either the patent, tangible embodiments of the

159. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2002) ("There is no practicing the prior art defense.").
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patented subject matter, or the business or R&D concerns of the grantees. In addition,
the arguments that such servitudes might violate public policy may not be strong.
There is some debate over whether the touch and concern requirement still exists
in connection with servitudes, and if so, whether it applies to a servitude attached to
chattel. Even assuming that the touch and concern requirement has breath, it may not
be particularly problematic in connection with chattels. 160 While there may be
conflicting formulations of the touch and concern requirement, it can generally be said
that for a covenant to touch and concern it must affect the use of the property, or, as
one case put it, "the promise must exercise direct influence on the occupation, use or
enjoyment of the premises." 161 Thus, an imposed servitude that affects externalities
created in connection with the use of a particular property is likely to touch and
concern that property. This likely captures most servitudes that are not completely
arbitrary and unreasonable. 162
Here, the servitudes seem to clearly touch and concern either the patent or tangible
embodiments of the patented subject matter. It is, after all, the patent and
embodiments of the patented subject matter that must be used by any grantee in much
the same way that a grantee of a parcel ofland would use or improve a parcel ofland
in which she owns a life estate or term of years. Without a desire to use the patent,
there is little point in becoming a grantee.
Moreover, the servitudes discussed clearly touch and concern the business of
being a university or other institution that is engaged in research and development. To
the extent universities are in the business of doing research, they have a significant
interest in maintaining access to cutting edge research and development. It is access
that makes them competitive in terms of public grants, publications, reputation, hiring,
and patenting. Goodwill flows from making and publicizing discoveries that promise
to impact health and well-being. Moreover, there is goodwill to be gained by an
institution taking proper steps or creating the perception that proper socially
responsible steps have been taken to ensure that the public has reasonable access to the
products of its publicly funded work. The goodwill that flows from being a successful
research university might lead to tax advantages, favorable land deals from local
authorities, committed employees, gifts from private donors for endowed chairs, new
departments and buildings, or new equipment and infrastructure improvements.
Under the Restatement's approach, one should consider whether a patent servitude
is illegal, unconstitutional, or violative of public policy. 163 The first two objections set
forth in the Restatement seem (at least generally) facially inapplicable. As noted
previously, 164 there is no general prohibition on personal property servitudes. One
commentator has concluded that even the application of patentleft open source
licensing provisions would not be anticompetitive under the antitrust rule of reason or

160. See Robinson, supra note 142, at 1455.
161. See Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961).
I 62. There is no requirement that a servitude do a particularly good job of adjusting the capture of
externalities. If it does a poor job, one might expect that the burden of the servitude would create a
competitive disadvantage--a natural selection against whatever the restriction on use happened to be.
(THIRD)PROP.:SERVITUDES
§ 3. I (2000) (discussing servitude requirements).
163. See RESTATEMENT
164. See supra note 144 (discussing the work of Feldman and Robinson).
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be inconsistent with patent policy. 165 The more limited footprint of the servitudes
described here seem to place them even more comfortably within the contemporary
innovation framework.
C. Additional Considerations

In overview, the use of patent servitudes can be employed as a sort of "openprospect" approach to innovation. The prospector retains some control over the
organization of the downstream work (i.e., by exercising some level of judgment over
the grantees that would be allowed a "plot" in the subdivision). But because the
"profit" the prospector seeks, while pecuniary, is not in the form of direct near-term
licensing revenue, but rather in the form of (indirect) goodwill as a going concern,
competitive advantage in hiring, and grant dollars, the prospector should have a pretty
liberal view of who can be a grantee. Moreover, the prospector is happy to let much
of the R&D happen through self-ordering among the grantees, thereby avoiding one
of the more common criticisms of the prospect approach.
The restricted co-ownership approach reflected by the use of a servitude has
several positive features. One is that it is consistent with the policy of patent law that
encourages the use ofpatents.1 66 Co-owners can generally make grants of rights, or
license others to practice the subject matter of a patent. 167 These rights protect
successors in interest from suits for infringement. 168 For a number of reasons, 169
universities should be motivated to make restricted grants ofsome 170 of their patents.
By granting the right to alienate, to the extent of the grantee's restricted property,
universities can make it easier for others to become grantees or to at least get use
permissions. The greater the number of grantees, the greater the supply of grants or
permissions. The increase in supply could have a corresponding affect on the cost of
access. Thus, when faced with litigation, the path of least resistance for a potential
infringer may be to obtain a restricted grant or restricted license from a university or
other grantee.
Assuming liberal granting by universities and a corresponding reduction in the
cost of access, a reduction of the innovation suppressive costs of monopoly and
transaction could be realized. Also, to the extent that positive gains may be possible

165. See also Feldman, supra note 144, at 167 (concluding that open source biotechnology licensing
"should not constitute [patent] misuse"); cf Boettinger & Burk, supra note 138 (providing additional
discussion of misuse in connection with biotechnology licensing strategies).
166. See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing
some of the aspects of co-ownership of a patent). Naturally this statement assumes some judgment on the
part of the patentee that imposes the servitude. In particular, that it not be done in situations that will cause
everyone to shun using the technology controlled by the patent.
167. Id. at 1471-72.
168. Id.
I 69. See discussion supra at Part lll.B.
170. Patents for which there is a high demand, and for which significant licensing revenue is available,
might be better deployed in a traditional licensing or exclusive assignment fashion. Whether the restricted
grants discussed here should be used ought to reflect some balancing of the revenue available through
licensing, the nature of the subject matter, and the mission of the institution. For example, inventions
directed to high profile, underserved markets might be better deployed through restricted grants.
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through the application of peer production, 171 these too could be realized. Moreover,
if the patented subject matter is important, e.g., a punctuating advance or subject matter
the use of which is required for a particular stage of innovation, there may be a
selective advantage to the servitude approach that could enhance compliance.
Presumably some number of innovators who receive grants will invest in a path of
innovation that relies on the rights granted. As more do so, the less sense it might
make for any particular innovator to wait and litigate access. To do so might place the
recalcitrant innovator at a selective disadvantage-particularly if innovation in the field
is fast-paced. 172
The temporal qualities of Covenants 1 and 2, and perhaps the reach of Covenant
3 mitigate significantly the indefinite viral spread that follows from a traditional GPLlike approach. 173 This can be viewed as a positive consequence because ifthere is no
substantial advance on an open project in ten to twenty years, then perhaps the open
approach to the project should be scrapped. Generally speaking, however, there is the
expected trade off; the proposed innovation framework is not contemplated to be
indefinite in duration or ever expanding in scope, so there will be times when rights
need to be sorted out.
For example, innovation could take longer than the term ofa patent. In that case,
it is possible that innovators will have to reorganize in view of the property landscape
when the restriction terminates. 174 Second, a patentable, commercializable therapeutic
may have been developed during the period of the restriction. If so, when it ends some
rights connected with the making of the therapeutic may become enforceable against
the joint owners of the former property. Naturally, there would have to be negotiations
-with their attendant costs. But as opposed to forcing negotiations in view of very
poor information concerning profits, negotiations over rights in view of reasonably
expected profits (dividing up a pot of money) could be easier for sophisticated parties.
The servitudes provide flexibility in termination that has been honed over
centuries in the common law. Plus, as noted above, the irritable organism that is a
property owners association can also abandon the restriction. If, for example, it
becomes clear that an important therapeutic is at hand, the owners of the different
"plots" will have a much better idea of the potential benefits involved. Because there
would be more information available than before R&D began, it would be easier for
sophisticated parties to divide up what would likely be more discrete benefits than to
divide up, ante, what would likely be more speculative ones. This could permit a
framework for collective appropriation, 175 which could help to enhance the productivity
of the approach. Thus, if a POA were used, a strategic approach could "pay off'' a

171. While possible, a grant need not be given to each peer worker. Grants could be given to firms or
institutions whose relationships with employees are governed by employment contracts or state laws.
172. A similar result should be expected if the open approach actually accelerates innovation.
173. Covenant 4 is not well-tailored to avoid this effect.
174. However, there is no guarantee that this must be so. For example, if the approach is working well,
other technologies may be granted to owners in the subdivision on the same terms, thus keeping the open
approach alive.
175. See Benkler, supra note 102, at 443 (discussing collective appropriation in connection with peer
production). Each joint owner would be bought out in a manner similar to a partition by sale.
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sufficient percentage of members to secure a release. Alternatively, members' consent
could be purchased based on the extent of their contribution, e.g., payments for access
to later developed complementary rights, or other measures of contribution.
An additional strength of the co-ownership regime is that it would generally
protect a "right to practice." Because in many scenarios the servitude will not need to
be terminated for a co-owner to practice an improvement, the right to practice retained
by other grantees will encourage cooperation, and therefore valuable collective
appropriation, or lead to competition in production that should move pricing closer to
marginal cost.
When the restrictions end before the patent term, because the grantees are all joint
owners of the patent, they retain the rights of ownership, including the right to license
others. This maintains some of the open character of the patent but eliminates the
promise by other grantees that they will not enforce patents they have obtained on
improvements. Although this might at first appear to be problematic, it need not be for
reasons already discussed. Other technologies may be granted to owners in the
subdivision on the same terms, thus keeping the open approach alive. Even where that
does not happen there will be notice of termination, allowing competitive grantees to
arrange their affairs. If after ten, fifteen, or twenty years, the open approach has not
produced results, the ending of the servitude and a general reorganization might be
desirable.
Finally, and more broadly speaking, the servitudes are directed to a recognized
public good: encouraging innovation. To the extent that there is little interest in
licensing a patent, the objection to making restricted grants such as those described
here should not be too great. How well they work will depend on how well they are
created and applied to particular circumstances. If successful they could produce a
social benefit, but if they fail, relatively little should be lost. No less one suspects, than
what would be lost from ignorance or incompetent licensing. Neither of which seem
protected against by law. And, like the roots of a tree moving toward water, the
progress of innovation can be expected to continue along some path regardless.

V.

CONCLUDING

REMARKS

While the approach described by this Article could be implemented by any patent
applicant or patentee, as a systematic approach it is expected to be most useful when
applied by universities and research-oriented medical schools. Exclusive licensing
provides one framework by which a university can realize a return on investment. But
as a general matter, most universities and medical schools are not profiting from this
approach. Moreover, at least some patent case law appears unfavorable to the prospect
176
while other
ofuniversities appropriating the value of their patents through licensing,
patent case law holds that universities are fair game in suits for patent infringement, no
matter how attenuated their potential reward from the development of patented subject

176. See, e.g., Univ. ofRochesterv. G.D. Searle and Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559, 1562-64, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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matter. 177 Finally, there appears to be a growing normative sentiment that patents are
threatening basic science. 178 To the extent this state of affairs is a sign of things to
come, universities may have to look elsewhere for a return on their investment in
research and development.
The approach described here presents a different, yet perhaps still useful, way for
universities to get a return on their research and development investment. While
patents that promise immediate royalty revenue can still be licensed, patents that do not
can be deployed differently: To enhance the reputation of the institution; to encourage
donors and hire and retain skilled employees; as a prophylactic against suits for
infringement; to maintain access to substrates and reagents important for the
institution's well being; to gain advantage in grant acquisition; and to gain advantage
in the race that is innovation. Beyond return on investment, as a shepherd of so much
public money the NIH and their grantees may bear some responsibility for the
efficiency with which that money is spent and some social responsibility in ensuring
that some of the benefits of that spending reach the public. 179 This or similar
approaches could be helpful in fulfilling that responsibility.
Universities are in an excellent position to implement this approach. The scope
ofbasic research in which they engage is broad compared to private companies. Public
researchers work in a comparatively wide array of model systems, employ a great
diversity of approaches, and generate a great amount and diversity of discovery. They
are also more likely to be first in time to important upstream discoveries. To the extent
that pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies play a more dependent role, a
patent-based open science approach may provide an evolutionary advantage in
innovation; one that would therefore be guarded by the approach.
By spreading appropriability to multiple firms, the described approach is properly
concerned with ensuring that the incentive to innovate is not destroyed. Several of its
features operate to permit some appropriability. As described elsewhere, 180 there are
means, e.g., virtual or nonprofit pharmaceutical firms, NGOs, and contract research
organizations 181 that can help to fund or perform research, or produce therapeutics.
Moreover, administrative processes and the technical difficulties involved in
reproducing some potential therapeutics 182 may give sufficient exclusivity to encourage
their production by for-profit firms.
Finally, in applying this approach, prudence should be the guide. It would be
helpful to test this approach, so that empirical data might be generated on how well it
works and what unexpected drawbacks, if any, are revealed. Accordingly, to learn

177. See, e.g., Matley v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
178. See, e.g., Lori Andrews et al., When Patents Threaten Science, 341 SCIENCE1395, 1396 (2006)
(reflecting in the title this theme).
179. A large amount of research funding at public institutions comes from taxpayers and is distributed
by the NIH. In 2005, the NIH gave out over $22 billion in research dollars to "universities, medical schools
and other research institutions." See http://www.nih.gov/about/NIHoverview.html.
180. See Maurer et. al., supra note 94, at 183.
181. See id.
182. For example, biologics and complex macromolecules are difficult, if not impossible, to precisely
reproduce. Moreover, it might be difficult to know whether one company has used another company's
process in making a biologic, at least to the extent required to satisfy the Hatch-Waxman Act. See 21
U.S.C. § 355 (2000) (providing for abbreviated new drug applications).
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more about the patent-based open science approach described here, a study is
advisable. One or more significant (but perhaps underworked) patents addressing
innovation markets that are currently underserved should be made subject to a
servitude applying the general principles described here. Subsequent interest in their
use, and their actual use, could be monitored, measured, and reported upon
periodically.
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